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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----00000----

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF
AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED
SCIENCE, a Utah body
politic and corporate,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
BEAR STEARNS & CO., a
corporation,
Defendant-Third
Party P1a inti ff
and Appellant,
vs.
PHILLIP A. BULLEN, JAY R.
BINGHAM, O.C. HAMMOND, JAY
DEE HARRIS, BEVERLY D.
KUMPFER, SNELL OLSEN, REX
G. PLO\~MAN, W. B. ROBINS,
ALVA C. SNOW, WILLIAM R.
STOCKDALE, JANE S. TIBBALS,
GLEN L. TAGGART, DEE A.
BROADBENT, L. MARK NEUBERGER,
DONALD A. CATRON, JOHN DOES,
THE INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL OF
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF
AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED
SCIENCE,
Third-Party
Defendants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY

Docket No. 16274
(Consolidated)

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF
AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED
SCIENCE, a Utah body
politic and corporate,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs .
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SUTRO & CO., INCORPORATED,
Defendant-ThirdParty Plaintiff
and Appellant,

vs.
PHILLIP A. BULLEN, et al.,
Third-Party
Defendants.
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF
AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED
SCIENCE, a Utah body
politic and corporate,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

vs.
HORNBLOWER & WEEKS-HEMPHILL
NOYES, INC., a corporation,
Defendant-ThirdParty Plaintiff
and Appellant,

vs.
PHILLIP A. BULLEN, et al.,
Third-Party
Defendants.
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF
AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED
SCIENCE, a Utah body
politic and corporate,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

vs.
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MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE,
FENNER & SMITH, INC., a
corporation,
Defendant-Thirdparty Pl a i n ti ff
and Appell ant,
vs.
PHILLIP A. BULLEN, et al.,
Third-Party
Defendants.
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF
AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED
SCIENCE, a Utah body
politic and corporate,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
BOSWORTH, SULLIVAN AND
COMPANY,
Defendant-ThirdParty Plaintiff
arid Appellant,
vs .
PHILLIP A. BULLEN, et al.,
Third-Party
Defendants.

ON APPEAL FROM THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
----00000----

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent Utah State University ("the University")
filed each of these five actions against the various brokers
to recover its losses on investments in securities which this
Court has already held were ultra vires.l/
Each broker subsequently filed a third-party complaint against various University officials seeking indemnity.
Four of the brokers also filed Counterclaims.
These five lawsuits were consolidated for purposes
of this intermediate appeal.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Two of the five brokers filed motions for change
of venue to Salt Lake County.

The other three brokers filed

motions to dismiss for lack of if!. personam jurisdiction.
These motions were all denied.
All of the brokers also filed motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6).
These were also denied.

l/

Later, all of the brokers renewed

First Equity Corporation of Florida v. Utah State University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah, 1975). These brokers appeared there as amici curiae.
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their Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss but they were again
denied.
Meanwhile, the University filed motions for partial summary judgment against each broker on the issue of
liability alone.

The Court granted these motions and en-

tered orders thereon on January 3, 1979.

Simultaneously

it entered orders dismissing the brokers' third-party actions
and counterclaims.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
All brokers petitioned for intermediate appeal (1)
from the orders denying their motions to dismiss for lack
of i.!l personam jurisdiction or for change of venue, respectively, and for failure to state a claim for relief, and (2)
from the orders granting the University's motions for partial
summary judgment and dismissing the brokers' third-party complaints for indemnity and counterclaims.

This Court granted

these petitions as to the aforementioned orders.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The University's Statement of Facts falls into
two natural divisions.

The first part consists of those

facts surrounding the issue of liability (1) as between the
University and the brokers and (2) as between the brokers
and the third-party defendants (University officials).
The second part consists of those facts controlling whether
or not i.!l personam jurisdiction is had or venue was proper.
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I

The University will present a separate Statement of
Facts dealing with jurisdiction and venue at the point
in this brief where it addresses those issues.

This

format somewhat follows that of the brokers who defer
their discussions of jurisdiction and venue until the
end of their briefs.
The University does not wish to burden the Court
with a separate Statement of Facts on the issue of liability.

The two broker briefs£/ have already devoted 30

pages to this subject, much of which is relevant, if at
all, to their assertion that the University officials who
authorized the ultra vires stock purchases should bear the
ultimate legal liability for the losses.

Any rebuttal of

these alleged facts as they might bear on the question of
indemnity will undoubtedly come from counsel for the thirdparty defendants.

The University will comment here on the

brokers' Statements of Facts only as those alleged facts relate to the issue of liability on the part of the brokers. That
is to say, the University here addresses the facts only as
they concern its motions for partial summary judgment and
the brokers' Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.

£1

One brief of Bosworth, Sullivan and Company ("Bosworth")
and the second a joint brief for the other four brokers.
Hereafter, the briefs will be distinguished by calling
them "Bos\'1orth's brief" and "the four brokers' brief."
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The most important point to remember in sifting through the brokers' lengthy treatment of the facts
is that the University's motions for partial summary
judgment are not dependent upon one or another version of
the facts.

The brokers are liable to the University as a

matter of law even if the facts are as they assert them to
be.

The University sets forth the following comments to

the separate statements of facts submitted by Bosworth
and the four brokers not to preclude the existence of issues of material fact--because there are none.

But it does

feel an obligation to correct factual errors and omissions
present in the brokers' statements of facts.

It will not

submit its own Statement of Facts to do this but will
merely comment on certain assertions made by the brokers.
Additionally, the University will submit a short supplemental
statement of facts in two pertinent areas

whic~

the brokers

have not treated.
1.

Reply to the Brokers' Statements of Facts
a.

The brokers frequently recommended to the
University that it purchase a particular stock.

The four brokers state that" . . . only on a few
occasions did any of them make recommendations that the University purchase any particular stock.11.~_/

This assertion

is not only unsupported by the record references they cite
but is flatly contradicted by the uncontroverted testimony

ll

Four brokers' brief, p.4.
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of the University's investment official, Donald Catron.
His sworn testimony was that every stock the University
bought from or through Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill Noyes,
Inc. ("Hornblower") had been recommended to him by a
Hornblower salesman (Hornblower, R. 152, 153).

As to the

stocks bought from or through Bear Stearns & Co. ("Bear
Stearns"), Catron testified that a Bear Stearns salesman
recommended to him at least thirteen stocks and also probably eight other stocks.
b.

(Bear Stears, R. 152, 153) }.../

"The primary cause" of the investment program.

Bosworth avers categorically that the investment
program was "prompted primarily" by (1) criticism the State
Auditor voiced at the University for not drawing interest on
substantial sums of operating capital it kept in non-interest
bearing bank accounts and (2) an announced cut in legislative appropriations to the University.

While several University

witnesses believed that one or both of these factors may have
contributed to the institution of the program, the consensus

±I

Catron's affidavit concerning which brokers recommended
what stock was prepared in opposition to motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction filed by Hornblower, Bear
Stearns, and Sutro. Since neither Bosworth nor Merrill
Lynch filed such motions, Catron's affidavit does not
detail the recommendations made by those brokers. However, Catron's testimony as prepared for related federal
court litigation was that both Bosworth and Merril Lynch
recommended stock which the University bought. Bosworth,
it should be noted, does not claim in the instant litigation that it did not make recommendations to purchase
certain stock.
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of the testimony was that the program was simply prompted
by a general concern among University officials that these
operating funds should be put to work (Bullen 11-12; Robins,
19; Olsen, 22; Stockdale, 17; Harris, 10; and Catron, 60,
62)

..§/
c.

Influence of the Ford Foundation report.

The five brokers suggest that the University adopted
and incorporated into its program certain themes it took from
a Ford Foundation report--namely, an aggressive investment
policy and concentration of investment decision-making in
one person.

The role played by the Ford Foundation report,

as thus claimed, is greatly exaggerated.

Catron believed

the awareness of the report was simply an additional step
in the evolution of the program (Catron, 70).

Council member

Tibbals doubted it was the primary source (Tibbals, 27) and
many key University personnel had no recollection of the
"themes" the University allegedly lifted from the report or,
indeed, of the report itself.

(Harris, 17; Kumpfer, 38;

Plowman, 24; Robins, 40-41; Snow, 13; Neuberger, 21)
d.

The ambivalence of the Institutional Council.

Bosworth states: "Throughout 1972, the Institutional
Council gave wholehearted support and assistance to Catron."

References are to deponents and pages of their depositions. An index of the deponents by full name and title
is appended hereto as Exhibit 1.

I
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Bosworth then paints a picture of perfect harmony by
drawing selectively from the record.

For instance, Bosworth

quotes Councilman Harris as saying in June that "the University was moving in the right direction" and as saying in
July that the "investment staff was doing a remarkable job."
Yet the first comment was made with specific reference to
the staff reporting on its activities to the Council, not
on the staff's track record in the market.

And the second

comment also related to the development of better means to
evaluate Catron's performance (Harris, 35-36).

Indeed,

Harris was critical of the staff's investment decisions as
early as April, 1972, and he even stated he would vote to
discontinue the program if Catron did not become more conservative in his positions (Harris, 31; Deposition Ex. 39).
Again in November, Harris felt the investment portfolio was
in poor condition (Deposition Ex. 49). Harris was not alone
in criticizing the program in early November.

Councilman

Hammond and even Chairman Robbins voiced criticism.

Id.

The statements of Hammond were said to typify the ambivalence
of the entire Council in 1972.

(Broadbent, 140.

See also

Hammond, 47; Tibbals, 36)
e.

The January, 1972, corporate resolution.

The four brokers would have the Court believe that
the Co u n c i l thoroughly di s cu s s e d, before pass i ng, the res o l u tion of January 20, 1972, giving Catron broad authority to
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purchase stock.
man.

They cite the testimony of one Council-

They omit, however, the sworn testimony of everyone

else present at that meeting--eleven in

number--w~ich

was

that no discussion at all preceded the passage of the
resolution.

Specifically, Catron testified there was no

discussion and he certainly would remember because he had
drafted the resolution and knew full well that it was
worded to give him power to sell short and buy on margin.
(Catron, 155, 156, 261)
f,

What the brokers did to assure themselves
that the University had power to purchase
stock.

Repeatedly the brokers assert that by obtaining
from the University a written resolution reciting that it
had power to purchase common stock, they discharged their
duty of inquiry into the legality of accepting the University's purchase orders.

What they do not aver they did in

checking out the University so as to discharge this duty
is more significant than what they allege they did do.
Although throughout the brokers repeat that at no time did
the University seek an opinion as to whether it could legally purchase common stock, nowhere do the brokers aver that
one of them sought such an opinion, either from the Attorn_tl
General or their own private counsel.

Nor does any broker

claim that the question of whether it was legal to sell s!:.Qrt
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in the quantity involved here to a public institution was
ever referred to top-level management within its own organization.

Indeed, the only step each broker claims to have

taken to ascertain whether the University had power to purchase stock in seven-figure volumes was to obtain a written
resol~tion

from the University.

In the case of at least two

brokers, even this was not done until many months after the
broker began to buy stock for the University.
pp. 65-67.

See infra, at

Although there is some question that each broker

ever requested or obtained such a resolution,~/ even if it
did, this is no more than it would have required from any
private corporate client.I/
2.

Supplemental Statement of Facts.

a.

Margin account loans.

Merrill Lynch correctly states that it alone of
the brokers dealt with the University on margin.

It omits

to state that its margin dealings with the University were not

.§/

In the case of Hornblower and Bear Stearns, the record
does not establish that the broker ever obtained a resolution. Hornblower's affiant filed an affidavit in which he
purported to attach a copy of the University resolution
Hornblower supposedly received. Nothing is attached to
either the file copy (Sutro Record, Volume 22, p. 1975)
or the University's service copy. Bear Stearns' affiant
also purported to attach to his affidavit a copy of the
resolution Bear Stearns allegedly received, but the attachment is missing the seal and signature which were part of
the certified resolution. (Bear Stearns, R. 1999)
It is a routine practice in the industry that before a
broker does business with any corporation (or trust or
estate) it requests a copy of the legal document empowering the investment and authorizing a person(s) to make
the investment. See e.g. Bosworth, R. 920; Merrill Lynch,
R. 1437-1438;
Bear
Stearns,
R. 263,
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the usual kind where the buyer puts up at the time of
purchase only a part of the purchase price.

The omitted

facts are that on many occasions Merrill Lynch loaned to
the University substantial sums of money, which loans it
secured with stock it held for the University's account.
(Exhibit 64, page 17.

Exhibits are to all depositions.)

The volumes of these loans was such that on at least three
occasions during the life of the investment program, the
University had an outstanding balance with Merrill Lynch
on these loans of over $2,500,000.00 (two and one-half
million dollars).~/

The rate of interest Merrill Lynch

charged the University on these loans was one-quarter
percent above the "prime rate" meaning that for much of
the time during which the margin account was maintained,
Merrill Lynch charged interest rates between 11.50% and
12. 75% (Merri 11 Lynch, R, 1598-1604).

Before the account

was closed out, Merrill Lynch charged the University over
$193,000.00 in interest alone

~I

~I

Date

(Merrill Lynch, R. 1488).2/

Amount Due Merrill Lynch

November 30, 1972
$3,100,000.00
December 31, 1972
2,700,000.00
February 28, 1973
2,700,000.00
Source: Exhibit 64, page 17.
Merrill Lynch actually realized this amount when it
closed out the University's margin account by retaining
stocks belonging to the University worth over $193,000.
See the Second Count of the University's Complaint, R. _
2-3. The account was closed out after the Complaint ','a'
filed.
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The only step Merrill Lynch claims it took to ascertain
if the University had the power to borrow these sums and
pay these rates of interest was to obtain the same type of
corporate resolution it would require of a private carporate client.

Indeed, the resolution upon which Merrill

Lynch first relied in accepting business from the University was a Merrill Lynch stock form entitled "Corporate
Authorization for Cash Accounts." This form resolution the
University received from Merrill Lynch. (Merrill Lynch,
R. 1437-1438)

b.

The publication in newspapers that the
Attorney General concluded in December,
1972, the investment program was illegal.

In ordering stock from all of these brokers, the
University specified that

th~

orders be paid for "payment

against delivery of the certificates" at one or another of
two banks located in Logan.1.Q/

The function of these so-

called collecting banks was to receive the certificates
from the brokers and manually deliver them to the University
when the University's agent manually delivered a check for
th e p u r ch a s e pr i c e to the bank ( Be a r Stea r Ii s ,- R. 2 5 2 ) .
The brokers all knew of this arrangement, including the
identity of the collecting banks, and agreed to it.

1.QI

The Logan branches of First Security Bank and Walker
Bank & Trust.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

On or about December 15, 1972, the managing
officers of the two banks involved read newspaper accounts appearing in The Salt Lake Tribune, The Deseret
News, and The Logan Herald-Journal of an Attorney General's opinion of that date which concluded that the University never had the power to purchase common stock with
public monies and therefore its investment program was
illegal (Bear Stearns, R. 1144-1147, 1253).

Nevertheless,

all of these brokers except Merrill Lynchll/ and Hornblower
continued thereafter to accept and fill purchase orders on
the University's behalf.

The record contains no suggestion

that either collecting bank communicated to any broker the
contents of the newspaper accounts of the Attorney General's
opinion finding the investment program illegal or that if
there was any such communication, that any broker took any
steps to verify the correctness of the Attorney General's
opinion thus reported.

What does appear from the record

is that three of these brokers continued their dealings
with the University through one of the collecting banks
as if nothing had happened.
3.

Conclusion to the University's Statement
of Facts.

As will be seen, the University's motions for par·
tial summary judgment do not depend upon whether any of the

Merrill Lynch had discontinued accepting purchase
orders from the University prior to December 15, 1972.
for unrelated reasons.
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above facts is contested.

The University, moreover,

does not believe that any of the facts it sets forth
above can be contested.

Assuming, arguendo, the Uni-

versity's motions for partial summary judgment fail
because this Court finds a material contested fact to
exist, it does not follow that the brokers' motions
to dismiss should be granted.

The record as high-

1 ighted above poses many barriers to this Court holding that under no conceivable set of facts can the
University plead and prove a claim for relief as would
be necessary to warrant outright dismissal.
ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE
BROKERS WERE LIABLE TO THE UNIVERSITY.
A.

INTRODUCTION,

The record in this case is voluminous.lf./
However, only a relatively small part of the record is
devoted to evidentiary matters.

The bulk of it consists

of legal memoranda which for the most part plow the same
ground.

11.I

Judge Christoffersen has issued not one but four

The record contains 8604 pages excluding depositions
(22) and exhibits (one box).
-13-
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separate memoranda decisions addressing the issue of
liability.11/

It is difficult to imagine how any trial

court judge could have devoted more time and patience in
considering all the brokers' motions and requests than was
done here.l!/

No decision deserves more the indulgence on

appeal which the law has long recognized as does Judge
Christoffersen's ruling that the brokers are liable to the
University under common-law principles of public contracts
which this Court affirmed in 1975 in First Equity Corporation of Florida v. Utah State University, 544 P.2d 887 (hereafter referred to as "First Equity").
These cases do not present the diffuse issue, as
the brokers state, "whether there are, under any conceivable
state of facts, any limits on
to

recover

it

sustains as

vires

a g a i ns t

conduct,

a

i ts

l!/

ability of the sovereign

i n no cent agents

result

of

the

the

proprietary

l o s s es whi ch
and

negligence and irresponsibility

h i g h p u b l i c o ff i c e r s . "

ll!

the

li/

Th e s e c a s e s ,

ultra
of

its own

r a t he r , pr e s e nt

Bear Stearns, R. 289-291, 1775-1785, 2183-2186; Merrill
Lynch, R. 391-397. The first two were withdrawn.
Each broker, for instance, filed two i denti cal Rule 12(b' •
(6) motions to dismiss.
Further, the trial judge deferrec
ruling on the University's motion for partial summary jud,;·
ment for some 30 months. Most of this delay was in response to the brokers' urging that he should not decide ,
the summary judgment issue until after he ruled on motions I
filed after the University's motion for partial summary.
judgme~For a one-sided summary of the many motions an.
other filings made in this litigation, see pp. 20-28 oft'
four brokers' brief. This summary omits mention that the
four brokers filed affidavits of prejudice against the~
judge, further delaying proceedings (e.g. Bear Stearns,c·
4 2 3) .
Four brokers' brief, p. 29.
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the narrow and fairly simple issue whether the taxpayer
or these brokers should bear the loss from ultra vires
stock transactions where neither the University nor the
brokers knew they were ultra vires and where neither inquired of their lawyers to ascertain the University's
legal powers to purchase the securities in question.

A

related issue, present only in the Merrill Lynch case,
is whether the University has power to borrow on margin
and if not, does the taxpayer or the broker bear the loss
of almost $200,000.00 in interest charged on the ultra
vires margin account.

As to the main issue, this Court

has already all but answered it in First Equity.

As to

the Merrill Lynch margin account issue, this Court's
reasoning in First Equity compels the conclusion that
the margin loans were ultra vires and that the broker
should bear the loss, being charged with knowledge of
their unlawful nature.
B.

FIRST EQUITY SQUARELY HOLDS THESE STOCK
PURCHASES AND MARGIN LOANS WERE ULTRA VIRES.

In First Equity, another broker with which the
University did business had accepted a purchase order for
stock but had not been paid when the Attorney General instructed the University not to accept or pay for any more
stock.

The stock declined in value after the broker bought

it for the University and when the University failed to
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take delivery, the broker sought to recover the amount
the stock declined plus brokerage commissions.

Judge

Christoffersen dismissed the suit on the University's
motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, the five brokers

herein appeared as amicus curiae and urged unsuccessfully
most of the grounds they advance as parties herein.

In

a unanimous opinion (Justices Henriod, Ellett, Crockett
and Tuckett and Judge Hyde filling in for Justice Maughan)
the Court held:
l.

"USU had no specific designated power
from the Constitution or the Legislature
to invest its funds in securities outside
those declared lawful by [sec.] 33-1-1
[Utah Code Annotated, 1953] and investments in common stock are ultra vires
acts." 544 P. 2d 887, 892 . - - - -

2.

The stock purchase agreements were unenforceable.

Because the Fi rs t Eg u i ty op i n i on di s po s es of most of these
brokers' arguments, a copy of the entire opinion is appended hereto for convenience as Exhibit 2.
The brokers here urge this Court to reverse a
decision reached unanimously less than four years ago and
to hold that the stock transactions were lawful.

They

argue that Article X, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution
and Section 53-32-4 (part of the "Higher Education Act of
1969") each grants broad enough authority to cover the
purchase of stock.

In First Equity, the University devoted

35 pages of brief to countering the same arguments based on
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I
......._

the same constitutional and statutory provisions the
same brokers invoke here. 15 a/ In the First Equity
opinion, Judge Hyde discussed these same arguments for
over three pages (pp. 889-892) before rejecting them.12./
The key passages from his opinion of this issue are:
Nothing in the Constitution or
legislative action involving USU specifically grants or denies to USU the power
to invest state appropriations in common
stock. P. 890.
Whether or not the grant of a "general
control" of "all appropriations" and the
right to "handle its own financial affairs"
grant unrestricted power to invest is answered by The University of Utah v. Board of
Examiners of the State of Utah [4 Utah 2d
408, 295 P.2d 348] case. After quoting
Sections 1 and 2 of Article X of the Constitution which' mandates the Legislature
to provide for the maintenance of the University of Utah and USU, the Court states:
Would it be contended by the University that under Article X, Section
1, it might compel the Legislature to
appropriate money the University considers essential? Is it contended

15a/

Those briefs (Respondent's Brief and Respondent's
Reply Brief) are now included in Volume 904, Utah
Supreme Court Abstracts and Briefs.

1.§./

A careful comparison of the opinion and the University's two briefs in First Equity indicates that Judge
Hyde read the briefs with some care and used substantial parts of them in his opinion.
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that the demands of the University
are not subject to constitutional
debt limits? If so, respondent would
have the power to destroy the solvency
of the State and all other institutions
by demands beyond the power of the State
to meet.
The Court then quotes in full Sections 5
and 7 of Article X of the Constitution, which
provide, respectively, that the proceeds of
the sale of land reserved by Congress for the
University of Utah shall constitute permanent
funds of the State, and that all public school
funds shall be guaranteed by the State against
loss or diversion. Then the Court concludes:
It is inconceivable that the framers of
the Constitution in light of the provisions of Sections 1, 5 and 7 of Article
X and the provisions as to debt limitations intended to place the University
above the only controls available for
the people of this State as to the property, management and government of the
University. We are unable to reconcile
respondent's position that the University
has a blank check as to all its funds
with no pre-audit and no restraint under
the provisions of the Constitution requiring the State to safely invest and
hold the dedicated funds and making the
State guarantor of the public school
funds against loss or diversion. To
hold that respondent has free and uncontrolled custody and use of its property and funds while making the State
guarantee said funds against loss or
diversion is inconceivable. We believe
the framers of the Constitution intended
no such result. (emphasis added)
[1] As stated above, it is clear since
The University of Utah v. Board of Examiners
of the State of Utah (supra) case that USU
is clearly a state institution and that it
holds property in trust for the State of Utah
and is subject to the laws of the State enacted relating to its purposes and government.
p.

890
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I
I

.......

This Court has held that municipal
powers cannot lightly be inferred by
implication. P. 891.

A general grant to handle its financial affairs does not give authority to
invest in common stock. The power to
invest is not granted in the absence of
legislation to the contrary but the reverse is true. It depends upon a specific authorizing grant of such power. P. 891.
The opinion then discusses Section 33-1-1, the "only
specific Utah statute on the subject of investment," and
concludes that it does not empower Utah public bodies to
invest in common stock.
There is no need to canvass the law so recently
and ably discussed in First.Equity.

These stock purchase

transactions are clearly ultra vires, being the same transactions as this Court has already ruled upon.
While First Equity was not concerned with margin
loans, its reasoning disposes also of Merrill Lynch's contention that its loans to the University were lawful.

In-

deed, there is absolutely no plausible argument based on
any specific statute for the legality of these loans.
Merrill Lynch does not cite any statute to justify the
loans; the four brokers' brief on this point (pp. 55-58)
only argues for the legality of the stock purchases.
It is obvious that these loans were not of the
kind involved in the university bond issues described in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Spence v. Utah State Agricultural College, 123 Utah 182,
257 P.2d 367 (1953).

If the University could borrow mil-

lions without limitation, and pile up interest charges in
six figures, as it did here, why could it not borrow hundreds
of millions and run up interest charges in the millions?

As

First Equity discussed, all public school funds are to be
guaranteed against loss or diversion by the State.

To quote

from The University of Utah v. Board of Examiners of the State
of Utah,

~·

as reiterated in First Equity, the University

would "have the power to destroy the solvency of the State and
all other institutions by demands beyond the power of the State
to meet" if it could pay high interest rates to borrow in an
unlimited amount and have the State be obligated to guarantee
payment of principal and interest.
The sections of the Code cited to support the stock
purchases as incidental to the University's powers to invest
in certain instruments obviously do not apply here since these
loans clearly were not investments.

Merrill Lynch's position

that these loans were lawful is even less tenable than the
brokers' argument that the stock purchases were legal.
C.

THE LOGIC OF FIRST EQUITY COMPELS THE
RESULT THAT THE BROKERS BEAR THESE LOSSES.

This was the nub of Judge Christoffersen's two
memoranda decisions.lZ/

The University's position is nowhere

better stated than in those decisions.

In his decision of

July 6, 1977, denying the brokers' first set of Rule 12(b)

11.I See footnote 13,

~·
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(6) motions to dismiss,

he stated:

the broker-dealers are not
innocent as opposed to those individuals
they dealt with at the University. (T]hey too
are ~harged with the knowledge that the University could not deal in common stocks,
yet they entered into the transactions assumingly for profits of their own and now
seek to avoid the responsibility for them.
The question still remains where
the University does not have to pay for
commissions unpaid related to the transactions, can they recover those they
have already paid. This is not a transaction that involves just the hierarchy
of Utah State University and the brokerdealers but involves public funds and
monies placed there by the taxpayers.
To hold that the public funds could not
be recovered could further encourage
unauthorized expenditure of public funds
and would be no deterrent to unauthorized
expenditures if there could be no recovery,
since those dealing with public entities
in ultra vires acts would know that they
cou~terinto such transactions, for
their profit, of unauthorized expenditures
of public funds knowing there could never
be any action agaiAst them for recovery
of those public funds, no matter how illegal or unauthorized the expenditure.
This Court does not feel this was
the intent of either the Legislature or
the Constitution to expose the public
funds to such disbursement even though
the disbursement was made by persons in
an authorized position but where the transaction itself was unauthorized or l}l~gal.
Therefore, the motions are denied.~-a/
Later, in his decision granting the University's
motions for partial summary judgment, the trial judge
stated emphatically:
This Court has in other cases involving
USU and other brokers and in decisions involving these other issues in connection with these
defendants, held and indicated the contracts
l?a/

Merri 11, R. 396-397.
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for purchase of stocks were illegal, that
the brokers had notice or were required by
law to know that the transactions they were
entering were illegal. The defendant brokers argue that even if they were to assume
this to be so USU is equally to blame and
is equally to be charged with the knowledge
of the transaction since Catron was the
agent of the University and was given
specific authority by the board to enter
into such contracts.
This Court has repeatedly stated
and now holds that in this case there are
more than two parties interested in this
matter and who have financial interest
other than Utah State and the brokers and
that is the taxpayers whose money was used
in these transactions and whose money was
lost by reason of these transact~ons.
This Court feels that the brokers cannot
escape liability for their illegal acts,
acts with which they are charged legally
with knowing to be illegal by saying officials of Utah State also knew this and
were charged with this knowledge. The
Court feels where a governmental entity
is involved and the parties are charged
with the legal use of public funds that
the other illegal party ca"not escape
liability by saying the specific party
we dealt with does not come into this
matter with clean hands either.
The Court would, therefore, grant
the motion of USU for partial summary judgment and would deny the second motion to
dismiss by the brokers. (Bear Stearns, R. 21852186.}
D.

THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY FROM
OTHER JURISDICTIONS AND COMMENTATORS SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING.

Although Judge Christoffersen cited no case law
or other authority for his ruling, he was aware of over 80

-21-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cases from other jurisdictions (30 decided within the
last 30 years) which the University had collected and
repeatedly relied upon.

Rather than burden the Court

with a complete list of those cases

(which the Court

can find in the record, e.g. Bear Stearns, R. 689-719),
the University will here discuss only some of them . ..u!./
1.

Rationale of allowing recovery.

Various reasons have been set forth by the
courts in the below cases for the rule allowing recovery
where the contract in question was wholly ultra vires,
i.e. wholly outside the power of the public body to
make.11/

These reasons may be synthesized under three

headings:
(a)

Public policy requires courts to allow

recovery because a third-party contractor, who is deemed
to know the limitations of power of a public entity, would

..u!_/

The four brokers claim they "distinguished" the
University's cases (Bear Stearns, R. 2005, at 2062).
Their claimed review of "most" of the University's
cases did not even address 60 such cases. See the
University's rebuttal to the brokers' "distinguishing" of its cases in its Joint Reply Memorandum
Supporting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
pp. 22-27 (e.g. Sutro, R. 2027-2033).

1,11

The result is sometimes different where the body
has power to make a contract but does not follow
the required procedure in making it.

-22-
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otherwise be able to enter a contract with that entity
which is beyond those limitations, receive payment, and
the taxpayer would be left to pay for the unauthorized
expenditure.

(See the cases from California, New York

and Florida discussed below.)
(b)

Such a contract not only should not be

made but it cannot be made, and the agent making it on
behalf of the entity does not thereby bind his principal
notwithstanding he may be unaware of the lack of power
in the entity.

For cases reflecting this rationale,

see Stone v. United States, 286 F.2d 56, 58 (8th Cir.,
1961); County of St. Francis v. Brookshire, 302 S.W.2d 1,
5, (Mo. 1957); and Fulk v. School District No. 8 of
Lancaster County, 53 ILW.2d 56, 63 (Neb. 1952). 19 a/
(c)

As a matter of contract law, although in

the case of private individuals money paid out under a
mistake of law (as opposed to a mistake of fact) is not
generally recoverable, an exception exists in the case of
payment by public entities made under a mistake of law.
The leading case espousing this rationale is State v.
Axtell, discussed under Section 3, infra.

Other cases

following this reasoning are numbered in Section 4 as
cases 1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 18, and 27.

19a/

See also Norfolk County v. Cook, infra, at p. 25.
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2.

California cases.

The California Courts have repeatedly held
that public monies expended pursuant to unlawful contracts
may be recovered.
1942).

Miller v. McKinnon, 124 P.2d 34 (Cal.

Plaintiff taxpayer sued to recover money already

paid a contractor for work done pursuant to a contract
which had been let without following bidding procedures.
After dismissing the argument that it is harsh and unfair
to force repayment when the public body has already received what it paid for and cannot restore it, the Court
stated at p. 37;
(3) Persons dealing with the public
agency are presumed to know the law with
respect to the requirement of competitive
bidding and act at their peril [citing
cases].
(4) With the principles being as
above stated, it inescapably follows that
a right of action exists to recover moneys
paid to a contractor for work and materials
furnished the public agency where they were
furnished in contravention of a statute requiring competitive bidding. If, as we have
seen, the contract is absolutely void as
being in excess of the agency's power, the
contractor acts at his peril, and he cannot
recover payment for the work performed, it
necessarily follows that any payments made
to him for the work are illegally made and
may be recovered. If that were not true,
the competitive bidding requirement would
be completely nullified because the agency
could have the work done, pay the charges
therefor, and the taxpayers would be helpless to compel observances of the law. The
only event preventing that result in any case
would be whether some taxpayer acted soon
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enough to forestall the payment by injunction proceedings. The effective
operation and enforcement of the public
policy declared in the statute cannot
be dependent upon such an uncertainty.
The temptation on the part of officials
and the persons contracting with the
agency desiring to evade the law would
be to act quickly and secretly in order
that the taxpayers would be caught off
guard. Such a condition is manifestly
undesirable.
In People v. Union Oil Company of California,
310 P.2d 409, 413 (Cal., 1957), the Court said:
While as a general rule a mistake
of law is of no legal consequences . . .
it has been said that the recovery of public moneys paid out through mistake by the
state or an agency of government should be
permitted "in many instances where, if paid
out by a private corporation [they) could
not be." Aebli v. Board of Education, 62
Cal. App.2d 706, 725, 145 P.2d 601, 610;
see also 70 C.J.S. Payment § 156, p. 365.
In the Aebli case, suora, a 1944 decision of the California
Court of Appeals, the Court quotes the following reason for
this rule from Norfolk County v. Cook, 97 N.E. 778 (Mass.
1912):
An individual is dealing with his
own money . . . . public officers are dealing with money which is not their own and
over which their powers are subject to well
known limitations . . . when they act beyond
their powers they do not bind their principals. The payment of this money in this
case was not the act of the county, but
simply the unauthorized act of a public
officer. It was not the voluntary payment
of money by the owner, but by one who had
no beneficial interest in it . . . .
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j

See also, Los Angeles City School District v. Landier,
2 Cal. Reptr. 662, 666-667 (Ct. App. 1960) and Greer
v. Hitchcock, 76 Cal. Rptr. 376, 378 (Ct. App. 1969),
affirming that Miller v. McKinnon,

~.

is still good

law.
3.

State v. Axtell--A leading case allowing
recovery under the rule that public bodies
can recover monies paid out under a mistake of law.

In State v. Axtell, 393 P.2d 451, 454 (N.Mex.
S.Ct. 1964), the Court allJwed the state to recover
monies paid out unconstitutionally.

In doing so, it

exhaustively canvassed the question whether monies paid
out by public entities under a mistake of law could be
recovered.

The Court stated:
Neither they nor the appellees
knew at the time the funds were expended
that the payment was illegal--this knowledge had to await the decision of this
court in Hannah.
The rule simply stated is:
"Payment of public money by
officials made under a mistake
of law may be recovered."
5 Williston on Contracts, rev. ed.[1937]
1590 [p. 4436]. Such a rule, although
differently worded, is followed in practically every jurisdiction throughout the
country. See 3 Corbin on Contracts, § 617,
and cases cited in footnote 65; and Restatement of the Law, Restitution, § 46(a), and
§
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cases cited in the reporter's notes.
It is of interest to note that approximately forty courts of last resort follow the rule, although in some cases it
is not always applied under all circumstances. In at least nine jurisdictions,
which had initially followed the rule of
no recovery under mistake of law, the
courts have found it necessary to either
directly or impliedly overrule earlier
decisions, in order that a state or subdivision may recover funds paid under
mistake of law (emphasis added).
The Court in Axtell was faced with the additional question of whether the state could recover monies expended
pursuant to a seemingly valid legislative enactment
which was later declared unconstitutional.

In holding

that this did not defeat the right of the state to recover, the Court emphasized (at p. 457) that although
the good faith of the parties was not questioned, the
statute "unfortunately" was unconstitutional and the
payments therefore were illegal.
In these cases, the University did not pay
out monies pursuant to a seemingly valid statute which
was later struck down.

The reasoning of Axtell would

therefore apply with greater force to these cases.
4.

New York cases.

A recent case involving the question of whether
public entities can recover monies paid out illegally by
a public entity notwithstanding that substantial benefits
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were conferred on the entity which cannot be returned
is Gerzof v.

Sweeney, 264 N.Y.S.2d 376 (N.Y.Ct.App.,

1965), 276 N.Y.S.2d 485 (N.Y.S.Ct.,1966), 286 N.Y.S.2d
392 (N.Y.S. Ct., 1968), modified at 289 N.Y.S.2d 392,
and 239 N.E,2d 521 (N.Y.Ct.App., 1968).

In that case,

a contractor installed a generator for the Village of
Freeport pursuant to a contract held to have been awarded in violation of state bidding law.

In the fourth

phase of the case, the Court said (276 N.Y.S.2d 485,
489):
Permitting the Village to retain
the generator and directing repayment of
the sums illegally paid is indeed a harsh
result. Nevertheless the law is clear,
and to permit literal application of
equitable principles in this case would
invite the e~ils the statute is obviously
intended to prevent.
In the final phase of the litigation, the Court of Appeals was "concerned only with the question of remedies"
(239 N.E.2d 521, 522).

In holding that the generator

was nonreturnable and the contractor should be required
to pay the Village the difference between the price of
the generator and a competitor's bid for a smaller generator, plus the difference in installation costs and
interest, the Court said, at pp. 523-524:
If we were to sanction payment of
the fair and reasonable value of items sold
in contravention of the bidding requirements,
the vendor, having little to lose, would be
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encouraged to risk evasion of the
statute; by the same token, if public
officials were free to make such payments, the way would be open to them
to accomplish by indirection what they
are forbidden to do directly. [Citing
authorities.]
. . . There should, logically, be
no difference in ultimate consequence
between the case where a vendor has been
paid under an illegal contract and the
one in which payment has not yet been
made. If, in the latter case, he is denied payment, he should, in the former,
be required to return the payment unlawfully received-and he should not be excused from making this refund simply because it is impossible or intJlerably
difficult for the municipality to restore
the illegally purchased goods or services
to the vendor. In neither case can the
usual concern of equity to prevent unjust
enrichment be allowed to overcome and extinguish the special safeguards which the
Legislature has provided for the public
treasury .
. . . Only thus can the practical
effectiveness and vigor of the bidding
statutes be maintained.
Other New York cases have followed Gerzof.
S.T. Grand, Inc. v. City of New York, 298 N.E.2d 105,
107-108 (N.Y.Ct.App., 1973); Cupid Diaper Service v.
New York City Health and Hospitals, 381 N.Y.S.2d 996,
999 (N.Y. S.Ct., 1976); Lance Investigation Service v.
City of New York, 387 N.Y.S.2d 32 (N.Y.S.Ct., 1976).
Federal cases applying New York law to this effect are
Board of Education Central School District No. 2 etc. v.
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Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 453 F.2d 264, 268 (2d
Cir., 1971) and Fabrizio & Martin, Inc. v. Board of
Education Central School District No. 2, etc., 290 F.
Supp. 945, 956 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
5.

Recent cases from other jurisdictions.

Many other cases decided since 1950 hold that
a public body may recover payments made ultra vires.
Federal
5th C1rcuit:
1.

J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States,
308 F.2d 510, 515 (1962)

8th Circuit:
2.

Stone v. United States, 286 F.2d 56,
58 (1961)

Alabama:
3.

State v. Fourth National Bank of Columbus,
117 So.2d 145, 154 (1959)

~.

Alaska:
4.

Reliance Insurance Co. v. Alaska State
Housing Authority, 323 F.Supp. 1370,
1373 (D.Alas. 1971)

Arkansas:
5.

Mackey v. McDonald, 504 S.W.2d 726, 732733 (1974)

Florida:
6.

Mayes Printing Co. v. Flowers, 154 So.2d
859, 865 (Ct.App. 1963)
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Georgia:
7.

Polk County v. Lincoln National Life,
262 F.2d 846, head note 3 and 847
(5th Cir., 1959)

Idaho:
8.

St ate v . McCarty , 2 79 P . 2 d 8 79 , 8 8 1 ( 19 55)

Iowa:
9.

National Fire Insurance Co. v. Butler,
152 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1967)

Maryland:
10.

State v. Rucker, 126 A.2d 846, 850 (Ct.
App. 1956)

Massachusetts:
11.

Dunne v. City of Fall River, 104 N.E.2d
157' 160 ( 1952)

Minnesota:
12.

City of St. Paul v. Dual Parking Meter Co.,
39 N.W.2d 174, 181 (1949)

Mississippi:
13.

J.S. Love Co. v. Town of Carthage,
65 So.2d 568, 573-574 (1953)

Missouri:
14.

Count of St. Francis v. Brookshire,
302 S.W.2d 1, 5 1957

15.

City-Wide Asphalt Co. v. City of Independence, 546 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Ct.App. 1976)

Nebraska:
16.

Fulk v. School District No. 8 of Lancaster
County, 53 N.W.2d 56, 63 (1952)

17.

Cosentino v. Carver-Greenfield Cor . , 433
F.2d 1274, 1276 8th Cir., 1970
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I

New Hampshire:
18.
Ne~1

Opinion of the Justices, 175 A.2d
396, 398 (1961)

Jersey:
19.

Thornton v. Village of Ridgewood,
111 A.2d 899, 904 (1955)

20.

Shebell v. Strelechi, 249 A.2d 10, 13
(Superior Ct., 1969)

North Carolina:
21.

Rider v. Lenoir County, 78 S.E.2d 745,
748 (1953)

22.

Horner v. Chamber of Commerce of City
of Burlington, 72 S.E.2d 21 (1952)

South Carolina:
23.

Town of Beenettsville v. Bledsoe, 845 E.2d
554, 556 (1954).

South Dakota:
24.

Hauck v. Bull, 110 N.W.2d 506, 508 (1961)

25.

Carlson v. City of Faith, 67 N.W.2d 149,
151 (1954)

Tennessee:
26.

Crass v. Walls, 259 S.W.2d 670, 673 (Tenn.
Ct. App., 1953)

Washington:
27.

State v. Continental Baking Co., 431 P.2d
993' 996 ( 1967)

Wisconsin:
28.

Leuch v. Egelhoff, 38 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (1949)
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E.

THAT THE BROKERS IN MANY CASES WERE
ACTING ONLY AS AGENTS FOR THE SELLERS
IS NO BAR TO THESE ACTIONS.

Two of the brokers apparently never acted as
principals in these transactions--that is, they never
sold securities to the University out of their own
inventories but always acted as brokers in putting the
University together with willing sellers.

All of the

other brokers admit they were direct sellers in at least
some transactions.

Thus, the argument they raise con-

cededly only applies to some of the University's purchases and even if successful, would not defeat these
motions for partial summary judgment insofar as they
embrace the direct sales by the brokers.

Moreover, the

University in any event can recover the commissions it
paid directly to the brokers, which alone total in six
figures.

•

The brokers appear to concede this point.

By

doing so, they concede that this defense does not defeat
a motion for judgment as to liability alone which by
definition does not go to damages.
But even as to the transactions these appellants
merely brokered, their contention must fail.

Like most

of their other defenses, this has been weighed and found
wanting in First Equity.

The Court's reasoning there is

dispositive here:
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Although this action was commenced
and argued at the lower Court on the basis
of breach of contract between the parties,
plaintiff and Amici now contend that in
any event plaintiff should be entitled to
recover because they were acting as the
agents of USU. Under the theory of agency,
one of two things would occur; either the
loss would have to be absorbed by the seller
of the stocks who doesn't have the faintest
idea that his stock is being purchased by a
public corporation or the rules denying recovery on ultra vires contracts of a public
corporation would be meaningless. Substantive rights involving public funds should
not be determined by the custom of the securities industry in designating the broker
as the agent of the buyer or as agent of the
buyer and seller. The rules denying recovery
of an ultra vires contract are based on the
theory that the party actually dealing with
the public entity is charged with the knowledge that the contract is ultra vires and
unenforceable, and in this case the plaintiff is the party actually dealing with the
public entity and this action was filed on
that basis--that USU was a customer of First
Equity. Pp. 892-893.
As already noted, the Amici just referred to
were the brokers herein.
Bosworth attempts to distinguish First Equity
on this point on the ground the broker there sought

~-

forcement of the ultra vires contract, relying ostrichlike on the technical meaning of the language employed.
But it gives no reason why the public interest underlying
the result in First Equity does not compel the same result
here.

-34-
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None of the brokers' cases cited on this
point help them since they all involve valid contracts
and none involves the public policy considerations existing where a public body pays out tax monies under
an ultra vires contract.
F.

NEITHER THE SO-CALLED ILLEGALITY OF
THESE CONTRACTS NOR THE FACT THAT PAYMENT WAS MADE UNDER A MISTAKE OF LAW
PRECLUDE THESE SUITS

The brokers urge that the University should
not be aliowed to recover here because the "contracts"
were executed even though they might be ultra vires.
This part of their memorandum encompasses two distinct
arguments: (1) these contracts were not only ultra vires
and therefore void, they were also illegal so that the
law will not assist the University in recovering its
monies; and (2) the University paid monies voluntarily
under a mistake of law for which there is no right of
recovery.

Both arguments are fallacious:
1.

Assuming, arguendo, these contracts were
illegal as opposed to being ultra vires,
the rule contended for does not apply to
the University.

Nowhere did the Utah Supreme Court in First
Equity intimate that contracts to buy common stock were
anything but ultra vires.

The rule that payments made
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under contracts which are illegal may not ordinarily
be recovered where the parties are 2..!J.

~

delicto has

not been said to apply to ultra vires contracts.

More-

over, the "rule" has limited validity even as applied
to illegal contracts.

As stated in McCormick v. Life

Insurance Corporation of America, 6 U.2d 170, 308 P.2d
949, 951 (1957):
. . . The Courts have carved out
so many exceptions to the so-called "general
rule" that it can hardly be properly so denominated.
See also Second Russian Ins. Co. v. Miller, 268 U.S. 552,
562, 69 L. Ed. 1089, 1092 ( 1925).

One of the many excep-

tions is stated in Corpus Juris Secundum as follows:
The ordinary rule governing individuals, that when a contract against
public policy is executed, the law will
leave the parties where it finds them, does
not apply where the public is one of the
parties. 17 C.J.S. Contracts, 1197
The same proposition is formulated in 2d American Jurisprudence, Contracts, Paragraph 225:
. where a state is an interested party to an action, the contributing guilt of the parties to the suit will
not operate as a bar to the granting of
relief to the state.
See also Gwinnett County v. Archer, 118 S.E.2d 97, 101
(Ga. App. 1960); City of Philadelphia v. Rosin's Parking
Lot, 56 A.2d 207 (Penn. 1948); State v. Weatherby, 129

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-36-

S.W.2d 887, 892 (Mo. 1939); Burke v. Wheeler County,
187 S.E. 246, 249 (Ga. App. 1936); Restatement, Contracts, Section 601, p. 1116 (1932), especially illustration 4.

It can hardly be questioned that the

plaintiff herein is suing on behalf of "the public,"
being the State of Utah, First Equity, p. 890.
this is conceded by the brokers.

Indeed,

It follows that the

University is not governed by the so-called "rule"
urged here.
Because this Court in First Equity was not
dealing with an illegal contract, the brokers' oft-repeated argument that the rationale behind the First
Equity opinion precludes recovery in these cases is
specious.

The ground on which this Court decided First

Equity was clearly not that it wished to leave the parties to an illegal contract where it found them but
rather because it wished to safeguard public monies.
That same ground dictates that recovery be allowed in
these cases.
2.

The rule barring recovery of money
voluntarily paid under a mistake of
law does not apply to payments made
by the State.

The brokers rely on Section 45 of the Restatement of the Law of Restitution which, "[e]xcept as otherwise stated in Sections 46-55" bars recovery of monies
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paid voluntarily under a mistake of law.

Perhaps

they did not read the noted exceptions to the rule.
The first such exception found in Rule 46 states:
A person who has conferred a
benefit upon another because of an erroneous belief induced by a mistake of
law that he is under a duty so to do,
is entitled to restitution as though
the mistake were one of fact if:
(a) the benefit was conferred by a State or subdivision
thereof . . . .
Of the rule which governs these lawsuits, the Court
said in State v. Axtell, 393 P.2d 451, 454 (N.Mex. 1964):
The rule simply stated is:
"Payments of public money by officials
made under a mistake of law may be recovered."
5 Williston on Contracts, rev. ed., Section
1590. Such a rule, although differently
worded, is followed in practically every
jurisdiction throughout the country. See
3 Corbin on Contracts, Section 617, and cases
cited in footnote 65; and Restatement of the
Law, Restitution, Section 46(a) and cases
cited in the reporters notes. (Emphasis added.)
See the more extensive discussion of State v. Axtell,
~.

p.26.

As that Court noted, some 40 states follow

the aforestated rule.
3.

The brokers' reliance on two Utah cases
involving the Millard County School District is misplaced.

After complaining that the University's calleetion of cases referred to in D,

~·

consists mostly
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of decisions earlier than 1950, the brokers place
considerable emphasis on two cases out of Millard
County decided in 1919 and 1932, respectively.

These

cases, they say, support their contrived theory that
this Court's logic in First Equity would lead it to
deny recovery here by leaving the parties where it
found them.

As to the 1919 case, Judge Christoffersen

disposed of it as follows:
The defendants not only rely on the
First Equity case but also other Utah cases
and more specifically Moe v. Millard County
School District, 170 P. 980. In this case,
Moe entered into contracts with the school
district for purchase and installation of
heating and plumbing materials for which
partial payment was made; Moe sued for the
remaining purchase price. The district had
exceeded the debt limitation of the state
constitution and had not obtained a vote of
the taxpayers required to exceed the limitation formula. Moe conceded he could not recover upon the contracts nor upon quantum
meruit but the defendants here argue that
because Moe was not required to return the
partial payment this is authority that Utah
State cannot recover payments made to the
brokers on commissions or other losses.
However, this would be a case where the
school would enjoy the benefits of the
plumbing and heating materials installed
plus a return of their partial payment which
is not the case here. The University does
not seek to retain the stocks and receive
back their payments for the same nor do they
seek to retain the profits they may have made
in stock transactions and recover only their
losses, that any monies received by way of
the contract would be offset against the
losses. (Memorandum decision denying brokers'
first round of Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, July 6, 1977, Merrill Lynch, R. 395)
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J

Although Judge Christoffersen perceived
the crucial distinguishing feature of Moe, there is
yet another reason why it is inapposite here.

The

School District resisted plaintiff's suit to recover
the remaining purchase price on the ground the contracts were ultra vires in that at the time the contracts were entered the District had exceeded the debt
limitation of the Constitution, and had not first obtained a vote of the taxpayers required to exceed the
limitation formula.

Plaintiff conceded that he could

not recover upon the contracts nor upon quantum meruit,
but argued that he should be allowed to

remove~

the

plumbing and heating materials if he returned to the
District the monies he had received as partial payment.
The District claimed that the materials had become fixtures and could not be removed without harm to the building.

In rejecting this defense, the Court noted that

many of the items could be removed easily and without
damaging the building.

It then held that the contractors

be permitted to remove so much of the materials in value
as had not been paid for.

It further stated:

. . . there is nothing to prevent
the defendant school district from now
. . . entering into a valid contracti'or
the purchase of the materials as presently
installed. 54 Utah 144, 150.
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Judge Christoffersen thus could have added as an additional ground for not applying Moe the fact that the
contracts there were not wholly outside the powers of
the District to make but the District could have cured
the temporary defect by entering new valid contracts.
The contracts here, however, are ultra vires in the
primary sense of being wholly outside the powers of
the entity to make under the holding of the First Equity
case.
The brokers also offer language from Millard
School District v. State Bank of Millard County, 80 Utah
170, 185 (Utah, 1932).

However, the contract in question

there was outside the powers of a private corporation,
not outside the powers of the school district,

The lan-

guage quoted is therefore completely inapplicable.
G.

THESE TRANSACTIONS, BEING ULTRA VIRES,
CANNOT BE RATIFIED.

Bosworth--but not the four brokers--assert that
the University ratified the purchase contracts, or at
least a question of fact exists on this point.

It is not

necessary to determine if there is such a factual dispute
since as a matter of law these ultra vires contracts can~~-

not be ratified.

-~~

The leading treatise states simply:

Contracts which a municipal corporation is not permitted legally to enter
into are not subject to ratification [citing
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scores of cases from 29 jurisdictions]
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd Ed.),
Section 29.104(c), pp. 512-513.
The

rationale for not

cepts

ap~lying

traditional con-

of ratification law to these contracts should

be obvious.

Dishonest public officials otherwise could

easily circumvent the prohibition again?t ultra vires
contracts by the simple expedient of ratifying them.
Bosworth's cases are not helpful because they
do not involve ultra vires contracts of public bodies.
H.

THE UNIVERSITY IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM
SEEKING RECOVERY OF ITS LOSSES

The brokers place great emphasis on their argument that estoppel precludes any recovery here.

Their

argument fails because as a matter of law estoppel does
not apply against a public body, at least in these circumstances.

It also fails because even if estoppel were

available, the brokers have not and cannot make out the
facts necessary to give rise to an estoppel.
The brokers' reliance on estoppel is not new.
As amicus curiae, they argued it unsuccessfully to this
Court in First Equity.

The Court stated:

"
All persons dealing with officers or
agents of counties are bound to ascertain
the limits of their authority or power as
fixed by statutory or organic law, and are
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chargeable with knowledge of such limits.
No estoppel can be created by the acts of
such agents or officers in excess of their
statutory or constitutional powers."
For further authority for the proposition that
"one who deals with a municipal corporation does
so at his peril" see Thatcher Chemical Co. v.
Salt Lake City Corporation, 21 Utah 2d 355, 455
P.2d 769 (1968) and cases cited therein.
If the enforcement of this rule at times
appears harsh, it is a matter for the State Legislature to correct. P. 892.
Additional Utah authority that the government cannot be
estopped is found in Petty v. Borg, 106 Utah 524, 150 P.
2d 776 (1944) in which the Court stated:
. . . the government is not bound or
estopped by the acts of its officers or agents
which are not within the scope of their authority so the doctrine of estoppel is of no aid
to the defendant here.
See also 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,
Vol.)

(1966 Rev.

Section 29.104c, p. 517, citing 22 cases from 17

jurisdictions.
The two Utah cases cited by the brokers herein~/
were cited by them as amici curiae in First Eguity--but
with no success.
Western,

In Provo City v. Denver & Rio Grande

156 F.2d 710

(10th Cir., 1946), the Court con-

strued those two cases very narrowly.

The Court said, at

p. 712:

£Q.I

Wa 1 1 v . Sal t La ke Ci t y , 5O uta h 59 3 , 16 8 P . 76 6 ( 191 ?l
and Tooele v. Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406
( 19 41) .
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These . . . cases, considered in
their composite effect, seem to make it
clear that in Utah the principle of estoppel
in pais is to be applied very narrowly to a
city in respect of its right to reopen a
street for use as a public thoroughfare and
only in cases where the city acted within
the ambit of its legal authority but in an
irregular way.
In the appeal at bar, the University did more than act
"within the ambit of its legal authority, but in an
irregular way;" it acted completely outside the ambit
of its legal authority.
The four brokers refer to the views of several
commentators and state that the rule precluding the application of estoppel to the government is "now a largely
discarded traditional view."
this hyperbole be found.

Nowhere can support for

Even the brokers' leading

critic of the estoppel rule--Professor K.C, Davis--admits
that
. . . the courts usually hold that the
doctrine of equita~l~ estoppel does not apply
to the government.~/
Professor Davis nowhere says the courts have abandoned
or are abandoning this rule.££/

Recent cases he cites

QI

2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Section
17.01 at 491 (1958).

lll

Even in K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies,
he states: "Of course close and difficult problems of
estoppel of states or cities still arise which can
properly go either way." Paragraph 17.05, p. 409.
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following the traditional view and not applying
estoppel to states or cities include Austin Liquor
Mart, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 280 N.E.2d 437
(Ill. lg72) and Sykes v. Bell, 179 S.E.2d 439 (N.Car.
1971).

In Austin Liquor

Mart,~.

the Court stated

significantly:
It is firmly established that
where the public revenues are involved,
public policy ordinarily forbids the
application of estoppel to the State.
The above language points up the defect in the brokers'
argument that the winds of change are blowing away the
rule in question in all situations.

The cases they

cite, such as Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951),
do not involve the payment of public monies under ultra
vires contracts and hence do not consider the public
policy considerations present here.

In Moser, the ap-

plication of the estoppel doctrine was necessary to
allow a person to apply for American citizenship on the
same footing as others.

The protection of this personal

right involves the weighing of considerations far different from those requiring a corporation to ascertain the
limits of authority of a public agency from whom profit
is sought.

Other cases the brokers cite are City of

Marseilles v. Hus tis, 325 N.E.2d 767 (Ill. 1975) and
Franks v. City of Aurora, 362 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1961).
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These likewise do not involve ultra vires payments
and attendant public policy considerations relating
to fiscal integrity.
The four brokers devote several pages to an
1878 decision of the United States Supreme Court,
Hackett v. City of Otowa, 99 U.S. 86 (1878).

There,

a city issued bonds which recited on their face that
the proceeds therefrom were to be used for municipal
purposes.

The city had unquestioned authority to issue

bonds for municipal purposes but the proceeds from the
bonds in question were used to assist a private corporation.

The Court held the bond holder did not know

how these proceeds were to be used and had no way of
knowing they would be used for a non-municipal purpose.
The cases at bar are easily distinguishable in that the
brokers could have known, and therefore should be charged
with knowledge, that the investments here were ultra vires.
In Hackett, it was not the issuance of bonds which was
ultra vires but how the bond proceeds were spent.

Here,

the purchase itself was ultra vires.
But even if this Court overrules itself in First
Equity and earlier cases and holds that estoppel will lie
against the State in some circumstances, the brokers have
still not made out the facts raising the defense under
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the most favorable case law they cite.

Under the cases

cited by the brokers, for estoppel to serve as a bar
against the government, the government must have been
aware of the facts given rise to the estoppel at the
time of their operation (Four brokers' brief, p. 32).
The brokers have not shown, nor can they, that when the
University purported to authorize Catron to purchase
stock, it knew it had no statutory power.
argument is ironic.

The brokers'

It recognizes that for estoppel to

lie, the party to be estopped must know the facts and
the party asserting estoppel must be ignorant of the
true facts.

Id.

And whereas the cases, including those

of this Court, have universally held that a party dealing
with the government is charged with knowledge of the extent of its power to contract, the brokers urge this
Court to hold that such a party is ignorant of the true
facts for purposes of applying estoppel; at the same time
the brokers would have this Court charge the University
with knowledge that it lacked power to invest in common
stock for purposes of the estoppel rule.

Such a rule as

the brokers thus espouse should control the facts here
finds support from no source, even from Professor Davis.
Nowhere is the weakness of the brokers' estoppel argument
better refuted than in Judge Christoffersen's second
memorandum decision on liability:
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This Court feels that the brokers
cannot escape liability for their illegal
acts, acts with which they are charged
legally with knowing to be illegal by saying officials of Utah State also knew this
and were charged with this knowledge. The
Court feels where a governmental entity is
involved and the parties are charged with
the legal use of public funds that the other
illegal party cannot escape liability by
saying the specific party we dealt with
does not come into this matter with clean
hands either. (Bear Stearns, R. 2186)
1.

Rules of the National Association of
Security Dealers and Stock Exchanges
of which these brokers are members require
that knowledge of the University's lack of
power be charged to the brokers.

These brokers were at all relevant times members
of the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"),
the New York Stock Exchang.e ("NYSE") and the American Stock
Exchange ("AMEX").fl/

As such, they were all subject to

rules of those organizations which imposed on them a duty
to ascertain if a customer had legal power to purchase stock
or borrow money.

These rules read as follows:

Section 2, Article III, of the NASD
Rules of Fair Practice ("suitability rule").
In recommending to a customer the
purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member shall have reasonable
grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer
upon the basis of the facts, if any,
disclosed by such customer as to his

See e.g. Bear Stearns, R. 210, at 221-222 and 225-226,
228; and Security Dealers of North America, lOOth through
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other security holdings and as to
his financial situation and needs.
(Emphasis added.)
Rule 405 of the NYSE ("due diligence
ru 1 e") .
Every member organization is required
through a general partner, a principal
executive officer or a person or persons
designated under the provisions of Rule
342(b)(l) . . . to . . . use due diligence
to learn the essential facts relative to
every customer, every order, every cash
or margin account accepted or carried by
such organization . . . . (Emphasis added.)
Rule 411 of the AMEX ("due diligence
ru 1 e").
Every member, member firm or member
corporation shall use due diligence to
learn the essential facts relative to
every customer and to every order or account accepted . . . . The member, general
partner or officer approving the opening
of an account shall, prior to giving his
approval, be personally informed as to
the essential facts relative to the customer and to the nature of the proposed
account . . . . (Emphasis added.)
These rules exist pursuant to federal securities law.

The

suitability rule was promulgated under Section 15A of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. Section 78o-3).
The due diligence rules of the major exchanges were filed
pursuant to Section 6 of the same act (15 U.S.C. Section ?Sf).
All of the brokers except Sutro violated the NASO
suitability rule by recommending stock the University was
precluded by law from purchasing.

Further, none of these

brokers fulfilled their duty of due diligence to learn whether
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!

the University had power to purchase stock or borrow on
margin.

Certainly, their lone act of obtaining a routine

corporate resolution did not discharge this duty.
footnote 7 at page 9,

See

~·

As held by the Trial Court, the law has always
charged a person dealing with a public body with constructive knowledge of the body's contractual powers.

This it

has done even in the absence of rules imposing affirmative
obligations on a person dealing with the government to ascertain its powers.

Where, as here, such rules exist pur-

suant to law, there is even greater reason to charge the
brokers with knowledge of the University's limitations as
to these stock purchase and margin loans.

Although this

Court might be inclined to relax the traditional view of
estoppel as applied to public bodies in the right situation,
the brokers' failure in these cases to comply with their duty
(1) to have reasonable grounds as to the suitability for the
University of the many stocks they recommended, or (2) their
duty to use due diligence to learn the most essential fact
relative to the University's purchase orders and loan requests--whether they were lawful--militates against departing
from settled law here.
I.

IT IS NO DEFENSE THAT THE BROKERS HAVE CHANGED
THEIR POSITION IN RELIANCE ON THE REGULARITY
OF THESE TRANSACTIONS.

The four brokers argue that all they retained in
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these transactions were their broker commissions.

They

then assert that all these commissions were "paid out
through the ordinary course of business to satisfy [their]
regular expenses . . . " (four brokers' brief, p. 50). They
apparently would have the Court believe that none of the
commissions thus retained contributed to their profits--which
is on its face totally unbelievable.

But even if all four

brokers lost money during the three years in question--a
conjecture not supported in the record--their argument does
not cover the underwriting discounts they retained in those
instances where they sold the University stock out of their
own inventories.

Nor does it explain why Merrill Lynch

should not return to the University over $193,000.00 it received as interest.

Since this Court must affirm on the

liability issue even if the University is entitled to recover only some of its claimed losses, and the four brokers'
argument does not go to all of the University's damages
claims, their argument is no good defense here.
But even more defeating than the above factual
difficulty is the erroneous legal basis of their argument.
The four brokers rely on a case not involving ultra

~

payments by a public entity for their position that restitution is not proper where the money wrongfully received has
since been spent.fi/

This case they link with Section 69

Saw er v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Car . , 236 F.2d 518
10th Cir. 1956 . See footnote 164 of the four brokers'
brief.
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of the Restatement of Restitution.

But as discussed,

~.

at p. 38, the section of the Restatement of Restitution which
a pp l i e s h e re i s 4 6 ( a ) . .QI
Bosworth also urges the defense of change of position in reliance on the regularity of these transactions but
cites only one case in its support.

In Maricopa County v.

Cities and Towns, 467 P.2d 949 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970), the
county sued its own cities and towns to recover tax funds it
erroneously transferred for over 16 years.

Because the defen-

dants were also public bodies, had not sought the payments,
and had spent the funds on public roads, the court departed
from what it expressly acknowledged as the general rule of
Section 46(a) of the Restatement of Restitution and denied
recovery.

The announced .rationale, however, was not solely

a change of circumstances as Bosworth claims.
scored the narrow scope of its holding by
and estoppel as well.

The court under-

invoking laches

It stated:

We agree to the extent that neither
laches nor its generic parent, estoppel, can
be asserted to gain rights against the public
or to defeat the public interest [citing cases].
But the reason for the rule denying the defense
disappears when the contest is solely between
two public bodies. 467 P.2d 949 at 953.
First Equity has held that estoppel is not a defense where,
as here, one of the contestants is a private party.

The same

would be true of its generic offspring, laches and change of
circumstances.
Stating that a State agency conferring benefits under
by the S.J.of
Quinney
Law Library.
for digitization provided
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
a Sponsored
mistake
law
is Funding
entitled
to restitution.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-52-

J.

THE UNIVERSITY'S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED
BY THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS.

Only Bosworth raises the defense of unclean hands.
Its argument is that since the University is seeking the
equitable remedy of rescission, the University's action in
wrongfully inducing Bosworth to accept the purchase orders
constituted "unclean hands."

Further, Bosworth claims that

the University's failure to notify it after December 15, 1972,
that the Attorney General questioned the legality of the investment program was a separate instance of unclean hands.
Bosworth's argument suffers from at least three
defects.

First, the University does not seek equitable re-

lief; therefore, the equitable defense of unclean hands does
not apply.

These suits do not seek rescission of voidable

contracts but instead seek repayment of monies paid out under
void contracts.

The rules governing the recovery of ultra

vires public expenditures have been treated as part of the
common law unaffected by equitable considerations.
the discussion in Gerzof at pp. 28-29,

~·

See e.g.

The four brokers

recognize this and call these suits "common lav1 claims" (four
brokers' brief, p. 5).
Assuming, arguendo, that the University here seeks
equitable relief, it is decidedly untrue, as Bosworth boldly
avers, that "it must be taken as true that the University affirmatively and wrongfully induced Bosworth to act to its detri·
ment" (Bosworth brief, p. 30). As Judge Christoffersen early not
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. . . the broker-dealers are not
innocent as opposed to those individuals
they dealt with at the University. [T]hey too
are charged with the knowledge that the University could not deal in common stocks,
yet they entered into the transactions assumingly for profits of their own and now
seek to avoid the responsibility for them
(Merri 11 Lynch, R. 396).
And as he stated in his final memorandum decision on liabili ty:

This Court has repeatedly stated
and now holds that in this case there are
more than two parties interested in this
matter and who have financial interest
other than Utah State and the brokers and
that is the taxpayers whose money was used
in these transactions and whose money was
lost by reason of these transactions.
This Court feels that the brokers cannot
escape liability for their illegal acts,
acts with which they are charged legally
with knowing to be illegal by saying officials of Utah State also knew this and
were charged with this knowledge. The
Court feels where a governmental entity
is involved and the parties are charged
with the l'ega 1 use of public funds that
the other illegal party cannot escape
liability by saying the specific party
we dealt with does not come into this
matter with clean hands either (Bear, R. 2185).
Finally, Bosworth's assertion that the University
soiled its hands as to those transactions after December 15,
1972, by not alerting Bosworth to possible legal problems

raised by an Attorney General's opinion of that date is no
ground for reversal of the ruling on liability since Bosworth
did business with the University on many occasions prior to
December 15, 1972.

At best, the argument only goes to reduce
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recoverable losses.

The assertion, moreover, suffers

from the more fundamental weakness that the maxim

"One

who deals with a municipal corporation does so at his
peril"~/ does not depend upon whether the municipal

corporation is itself aware of its own contractual limitations.

Bosworth's duty to ascertain the limits of the

University's power obtains irrespective of the University's
ignorance or knowledge of them.

Bosworth cannot be heard

to complain that the result of this rule in these circumstances is inequitable in view of the widespread publicity
given to the Attorney General's December 15, 1972, opinion
in both Salt Lake City newspapers (where Bosworth's office
was) and the fact that the managers of the collecting banks
in Logan which Bosworth used had read the newspaper reports
and knew of the possible illegality.
Wall v. Salt Lake City,

~·

upon which Bosworth

relies, has been discussed and distinguished
pp. 43-44.

already,~·

Marin v. Calmenson, 197 N.W. 262 (Minn. 1924),

is inapposite because, inter alia, it did not involve a public body or tax monies.
K.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING VIOLATES NEITHER
DUE PROCESS NOR EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES.

The four brokers complain their rights guaranteed
by the due process and equal protection clauses of the Utah
~/

First Equity, p. 892.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-55-

and United States Constitutions were violated.

Bosworth

echoes these complaints as to due process, but not as to
equal protection.
The brokers' briefs at this point are long on
rhetoric but short on closely analyzed legal precedent.
Typical of the rhetoric are Bosworth's claims that it "took
great pains" and "did everything reasonably within its power
to determine the validity of its dealings with the University." Y._/

Significantly, however, not one case cited in

support of either the due process or equal protection arguments involves an ultra vires transaction by a public body.
It is instructive that the brokers cannot find even one case
on point in view of the hundreds of cases decided in virtually
every jurisdiction on the issue of whether a public entity
can recover monies paid out pursuant to ultra vires contracts.
Surely if these well known constitutional objections were
persuasive defenses under these circumstances, they would
have been urged many times before.

The fact that no court

has discussed either objection in an ultra vires setting is
convincing, if circumstantial, evidence that judges have not
been impressed by them.
The short answer to the due process objection was
that given by the Trial Court here:

ll_!

Bosworth brief, pp. 30, 33. That Bosworth took no
pains which it would not have taken for a private
customer is discussed, ~· at page 9.
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As to their fifth allegation alleging there should be a dismissal because
of a denial of due process has been determined in Utah in Thatcher Chemical Co. v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 455 P.2d 769, News
Advocate Publishing Co. v. Carbon County,
269 P. 129, and in the First Equity case.
The one who deals with a public entity,
such as Utah State, does so at their peril
and that recovery is appropriate if other
defenses are not valid. (Merrill Lynch,
R. 394)
The four brokers' equal protection argument is
that there is no rational basis for treating the University
different from private persons in the matter of legal defenses available to these lawsuits.

As might be expected,

no real authority is mentioned for this sweeping proposition.
Moreoever, in light of the public policy considerations painstakingly articulated in First Equity, Miller v. McKinnon,
~·

and Gerzof v. Sweeney,

the many cases cited in D,
strably false.

~.

~.

to name only a few of

the proposition is demon-

There are ample legitimate public policy

grounds for precluding the defense of estoppel where to
allow it would open wide the doors to the public treasury.
Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah, 1975) is not
authority that this Court feels the University's "right to
resist estoppel is properly no broader than its right to invoke sovereign immunity." (Four brokers' brief, p. 46.)

That

case s imply construed the term "government a l fun ct i on" to ex elude a city hospital.

The holding of that case assumes no
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constitutional dimensions as the brokers suggest.

Indeed,

the holding has been legislatively reversed by a 1978
amendment to the Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-3,
Utah Code Annotated (1953).
L.

THE ARGUMENT BASED ON THE UTAH UNIFORM
FIDUCIARY ACT IS NO BAR TO THESE SUITS.

The brokers contend that the University had
authority to invest non-appropriated funds in common stock,
and that Catron was a fiduciary of the University.

From

these assumptions, they conclude no liability lies against
the broker-dealers by reason of the Utah Uniform Fiduciary
Act.

This argument has three defects.

First, the first

assumption has already been rejected by this Court in First
Equity in holding that a'll monies in the University's possession, even monies acquired by gift, were subject to the same
investment restrictions.

That the Court dealt with the is-

sue is seen from its conclusion that the University "had no
specific designated power from the Constitution or the legislature to invest its funds in securities outside those declared lawful by 33-1-1 . . ~ 7 al," which section governs all
funds "in [USU's] possession."

Secondly, this Court in that

case fully considered the Utah Uniform Fiduciary Act argument urged here, it having been raised and thoroughly briefed
in the Petition for Rehearing.
27 a I

See the University's nineteen-

Fi rs t Equi ty , p . 8 9 2 .
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page Brief opposing the Petition, Utah Supreme Court Abstracts and Briefs, Volume 904.

The petition was denied.

The key case cited by the four brokers is
Sendak v. Trustees of Indiana University, 260 N.E.2d 601 (Ind
1970).

In Sendak, the court was faced with the simple

question of whether Indiana University could use donated
monies to buy stock in a private corporation without violating the Indiana Constitution prohibiting the State of Indiana
from becoming a stockholder in a private corporation.

The

court concluded that it could do so, on the ground that
Indiana University had been held to be a "private corporation" by prior decisions and not part of the State; the
monies, therefore, never became property of the State and
thus could be managed free from state restrictions.
2d 601, 604.

260 N.E.

In contrast, the Utah Supreme Court on two oc-

casions has soundly rejected the argument that the University
(and the University of Utah) are corporations separate and
apart from the State of Utah.
of

Examiners,~;

225 P.2d 18.

University of Utah v. Board

and Spence v. USAC, 119 U. 104, 113-114,

Moreover, the Utah Legislature has never be-

1 ieved that monies donated to the University do not become

subject to the control of the state; this clearly appears
from the passage of an Act in 1925, found in Chapter 16 of
the Session Laws for that year.

Section 6 of that Act states,

in relevant part:
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All monies received by the University of Utah or the Agricultural College of Utah from any source whatsoever,
shall be paid into the state treasury at
the close of the months of June and December
of each year and shall be placed to the credit of the maintenance account of the respective institution. (Emphasis added.)
The above statute was itself merely a rephrasing of statutory language appearing as early as 1917.

At no time in the

some thirty years or more that language was law was it even
challenged, let alone held to be invalid.
A third fatal defect to the Fiduciary Act argument
is the inapplicability of that Act to these facts, which clearly appears from language in Sugarhouse Finance v. Zions First
National Bank, 21 Utah 2d 68, 440 P.2d 896 (1968):
The purposes to be accomplished by
this [Uniform Fiduciary] Act would seem to
be to facilitate banking and financial transactions by relieving the depositary banks and
others dealing with a fiduciary from the duty
imposed at common law of seeing that fiduciary
funds are properly applied to the account of
the principal. In other words, the statute
places a duty upon principals to use only
honest fiduciaries, and gives relief to those
who deal with fiduciaries except where they
know the fiduciary is breaching his duty to
his principal or where they have knowledge
of such facts that their actions in dealing
with the fiduciary amount to bad faith.
(Emphasis added.) Pp. 69-70.
The operative language of Section 22-1-5 relied upon here
states that the "payee" of a check "is not bound to inquire
whether a fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligations
as fiduciary in drawing" the check unless he takes the check
with

actual or constructive notice of the breach.

In
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J"

the cases at bar, there is no issue as to whether Catron
breached his obligation to the University under Section
22-1-5 because the Administration and Institutional Council
believed~

monies in the pool could lawfully be used to

purchase stock.

This is not a case where Catron had author-

ity to invest only non-appropriated funds but breached his
duty by investing appropriated funds as well.
The four brokers refer to informal oral and
written opinions of the Attorney General to the effect that
endowment funds could lawfully be invested in stock even if
appropriated funds could not.

The two informal letter opin-

ions cited no authority at all for their conclusion and were
written before First Equity held that no money in the University's possession could be invested in stock,

The first

letter was the December 15, 1972, informal opinion which
first cast doubt on the investment program's legality and
the second was written long after the program terminated.
The brokers do not claim any of them relied on the Attorney
General's erroneous advice so they can claim no prejudice
resulted from these opinions.

Indeed, the brokers strenu-

ously urge that they should not be charged with knowledge
of the newspaper accounts of the Attorney General's December
15, 1972,opinion letter merely because the managers of the
two collecting banks read those accounts.

-61-
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M.

THE UNIVERSITY CLEARLY SUFFERED
SUBSTANTIAL MONETARY LOSSES.

Bosworth--but not the four brokers--argues
there is a question of fact as to whether the University
suffered any loss because the Legislature appropriated
to it slightly over one million dollars to cover some of
its losses.

This argument has been urged many times

before in this and the earlier federal litigation but
never accepted.

(To be sure, Bosworth devotes only three

sentences to its repetition here.)

Common sense, however,

wars with the notion that the University, as arm of the
State, suffered no loss because the Legislature passed a
special appropriation to assist the University in its most
dire extremities.

The simple refutation is that there is

no evidence the Legislature intended to extinguish any
right of recovery against the brokers or otherwise aid
them.

Indeed, it would have been unconstitutional for

the Legislature to have so aided the brokers.
stitution, Article IV, Section 29.

Utah Con-

It is elementary that

a statute should be construed so as to avoid unconstitutionality.

In this case, it is easy to construe the Supplemental

Appropriations Act of 1974 to avoid an unconstitutional result.

The Act only says as to the amount going to the Uni-

versity that it is to "replace losses incurred in the University's investment program . . . . "

How Bosworth can
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construe that language to be intended to absolve it or
any other person legally liable for those losses escapes
comprehension.
The argument has a second flaw.
appropriated only a million dollars.
gether pray for over four million.

The Legislature

The complaints toThe complaint against

Bosworth alone seeks over one million.

Although the Uni-

versity has not established its losses on the Record, the
reason it has not is because the Court has not yet reached
the issue of damages.

To say, as Bosworth does, that the

University must prove its damages to be over the amount of
the special appropriation is to ignore the procedural posture of this case.
N.

THE DECISION OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT IN
RELATED LITIGATION IS NO BAR TO RECOVERY
IN THESE SUITS.

The brokers suggest that this Court should be
bound by a decision of the Tenth Circuit in related litigation.

Utah State v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th

Cir. 1977).

Contrary to the brokers' view, however, there

is little if any similarity between the University's federal
law claims rejected there and its state law claims allowed
by the Trial Court here.

In Federal Court, the University

sued on the basis that the brokers violated the "suitability
rule" of the NASO and the "due diligence" rule of the New
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York and American Stock Exchanges discussed,
pp. 48-50.

~·

at

The University's theory was that these viola-

tions were of rules of quasi-public associations and as
such constituted wrongs against the University giving rise
to private actions in the courts.

The Tenth Circuit held,

however, that absent broker conduct "tantamount to fraud,"
no private right of action arose under either of these rules.
The rule that a public body can recover monies paid out pursuant to ultra vires contracts was not before the Tenth Circuit.

Indeed, the actions before this Court are based on

state law ultra vires principles over which there is no federal jurisdiction.

The Tenth Circuit's language means only

that the ultra vires character of these purchase orders does
not imply that the brokers' acceptance of them was "tantamount
to fraud" so as to give the University a federal right of
action.

The Tenth Circuit did not say that the brokers did

not violate the rules for purposes of disciplinary action by
the New York or American Stock Exchanges or by the NASD.
Not only is the language quoted from the Tenth
Circuit opinion irrelevant to these suits but one sentence
of it is totally untrue.

The University here does not seek

to "retain the profits it has made and recover from the
brokers the losses which it has sustained."

In all these

cases, it prays only for the difference between its losses
on securities purchased through the defendant broker and
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what it gained on profitable security investments made
through the broker.~/
Finally, it is not true as the brokers intimate
that the suits before this Court now are the same as those
brought in federal court.

The University's suits against

these brokers were initially filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah because only in
federal court could it urge its securities law (NASD and
Stock Exchange Rules) theories.

To those federal law theo-

ries, it is true, the University added under the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction the theory of recovery under common
law urged here.

When Judge Aldon Anderson dismissed the

federal law theories, there were no longer any claims for
relief over which he had jurisdiction to which the common
law theory of recovery urged here could be appended.

Con-

sequently, Judge Anderson dismissed the common law theory
of recovery without prejudice to it being refiled in state
court.

At no time did any federal court rule on the theory

of recovery now before this Court.
0.

EVEN IF THIS COURT HOLDS THAT THE BROKERS
ARE NOT LIABLE FOR LOSSES FROM STOCKS PURCHASED AFTER THE BROKERS OBTAINED CORPORATE
RESOLUTION FROM THE UNIVERSITY, THE JUDGMENTS
SHOULD STILL BE AFFIRMED AS TO AT LEAST THREE
OF THE BROKERS.

The four brokers state that they did not open
~/

In the Merrill Lynch case, the University seeks other
heads of damage occasioned by margin account dealings.
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accounts for the University until after they received
written resolutions from University officials (four
brokers' brief, p. 59). This is demonstrably false.
Merrill Lynch's own affiant admits it opened an account
with the University on July 22, 1970, although no corporate resolution was received until November 30, 1970
(Merrill Lynch, R. 1433, 1437).

Before receiving the

resolution, Merrill Lynch conducted nineteen (19) transactions for the University (R. 1, 10-11).
As has already been noted, neither Hornblower
nor Bear Stearns has established that they ever obtained
a University resolution.

See,

~·

page 9, footnote 6.

Bear Stearns' affiant does attach to his affidavit the
first page of the January 20, 1972, corporate resolution
but not the second page which would have borne the signature
and seal of the Secretary of the University's Institutional

•

Council .'l:.1.1

But even if this Court admits new evidence suf-

ficient to satisfy it that Bear Stearns did receive an authentic copy of the January 20, 1972, resolution on or soon after
that date, it should still affirm the judgment as to liability
against Bear Stearns as to six purchase orders it accepted
from the University between August 20, 1971, and the date of
the resolution. (Bear Stearns, R. 720-722, 1998-1999).

Bear

Stearns concedes it did not obtain a resolution copy for five
~/

See pp. 91-92 of the four brokers' brief for both pages
of that resolution.
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months and that in opening a new account for the University
it ignored its own requirement to obtain a corporate resolution (R. 263, 1998-1999, 2004).
As has also been noted, Hornblower's affiant attached nothing to his affidavit.

As far as the record shows,

then, Hornblower never received a true copy of any corporate
resolution.

Assuming, however, this Court allows Hornblower

to supplement its evidence at this late date, and that evidence shows Hornblower relied on a copy of the January 20,
1972, resolution, it should still affirm the judgment against
Hornblower as to fourteen trades it executed for the University from December 8, 1971, to the date of the resolution.
(Hornblower, R. 447-449)
II

EVEN IF THE UNIVERSITY'S MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE REVERSED, THE
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE BROKERS'
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE
A CLAIM FOR RELIEF SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
The brokers blithely assume that their Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss must be granted if the University's motions
for summary judgment as to liability should fail.

This assump-

tion is fallacious in at least two respects.
A.

THERE ARE TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT AS TO
THE CORPORATE RESOLUTIONS OF AUTHORITY

Except for Merrill Lynch, the brokers have not
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filed their own motions for summary judgment.lQ_/ They
have, however, submitted affidavits purporting to demonstrate that each of them obtained a cooy of a corporate
resolution from the University before transacting business
with it.

However, as has just been

discussed,~.

pp.

65-67, there is a substantial question as to whether Bear
Stearns and Hornblower ever obtained copies of any resolution purporting to authorize the purchase of stock.

More-

over, it is clear from the record that none of these brokers
filed testimony as to when they obtained copies of resolutions from the University.lll

It is also undisputed that

Hornblower and Bear Stearns accepted and filled many University purchase orders months before January 20, 1972, the
date of the resolution upon which all the other as well as
Bear Stearns definitely r~ly.

Likewise, Merrill Lynch alone

accepted and executed nineteen purchase orders before first
receiving a copy of a University resolution of authority
(Merrill Lynch, R. 1, 10-11).

Finally, a question is raised

as to whether Bosworth obtained a copy of the January 20,
1972, resolution upon which it relies before February 1,

lQ_/

Merrill Lynch's motion for summary judgment was denied,
the Trial Court finding triable issues of material facts.
Not even Merrill Lynch's affiant gave a date although a
resolution attached to his affidavit appears to bear a
date stamp of November 30, 1970 (R. 1433, 1437).
-68-
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1972--the date of its first purchase for the University.
All that is known is that Bosworth's affiant did not
specify when the resolution copy was received.
If this Court holds that the brokers should not
answer for any University losses after receiving written
authority, the University's complaints cannot be dismissed
as to those transactions conducted before then.

At the

very least, Bear Stearns, Hornblower and Merrill Lynch are
liable for losses on all securities they brokered for the
University prior to January 20, 1972, when the University
passed the resolution upon which they appear to rely.

There-

fore, the brokers' Rule 12(b)(6) motions were properly denied
below.
B.

THERE IS A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT WHETHER
PUBLICITY SURROUNDING THE DECEMBER 15, 1972
ATTORNEY GENERAL LETTER OPINION WAS KNOWN
TO,OR SHOULD BE CHARGED TO, THE BROKERS.

As discussed,

~.

pp. 11-12, the Logan and

both major Salt Lake City newspapers published accounts on
December 15 and 16, 1972, of the Attorney General's opinion
that the investment program was illegal.

Both managers of

the two "collecting banks" read these articles.

Whatever

these managers may have then told the brokers about what
they read (the record is silent on this point), three brokers-Bear Stearns, Bosworth and Sutro--continued thereafter io

-69-
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fi 11 University purchase orders.

This despite there being

ample evidence that Catron was ordered to stop buying stock
(Broadbent 203; footnote 46 of the four brokers' brief).
It is because of the purchases made after December 15, 1972,
that the University suffered most of its multi-million dollar
1 OS S. H_/

For the brokers to prevail on their Rule 12(b)(6)
motions, they must show that under no set of facts could the
University prove a cause of action as to those securities
purchased after December 15, 1972.

This they cannot do.

There is a triable issue of fact as to whether Catron received orders to buy no more stock sometime in December,
1972.11/
8).

Even the brokers concede this (Bosworth brief, p.

There is also at least a triable issue of fact as to

whether the brokers should be charged with knowledge that on
December 15, 1972, the Attorney General opined that the University could not legally purchase stock.

RI

Both Salt Lake City

Although the record is not complete on this point, it not
being central to the issue of liability, it is fully documented that between December 15, 1972, and mid-March, 1973,
when Catron was terminated and all new purchases ceased,
the market fell dramatically.
On December 4, 1972, Catron was told by certain key members of the Board of Regents (then the Board of Higher Education) and later that day by the Institutional Council
to "immediately reverse the Investment Policy." (Exh. 85D,
January 10, 1973, Minutes of Council, page 3).
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newspapers reported on the opinion.

Since Bosworth's

office was in Salt Lake City and the office manager and
salesman handling the University's account--Mark Haroldsen-presumably read one or both newspapers on a periodic basis,
it is a triable issue of fact as to whether Mark Haroldsen
or someone else at Bosworth read or heard about the newspaper accounts or of the Attorney General opinion itself.
It is also at least a triable issue of fact whether the collecting banks should be treated as Bosworth's agent for the
purpose of imputing to it the knowledge the managers of
those banks acquired by reading the newspaper accounts,
Indeed, the Trial

CoY~t

impliedly so held by its expressly

hold'ing that the collecting banks were the brokers' agents).i/
Although the brokers submitted several dozen affidavits
covering many points, it is noteworthy that no affiant for
any of the brokers denies ever hearing of the publicity surrounding the Attorney General's opinion.

This is all the

more interesting in light of sworn testimony submitted by
a collecting bank that it was unaware that the University
ever discussed the Attorney General's December 15, 1972,
opinion with any broker (Bear Stearns, R. 1547, 1548).

l.1_/

Judge Christoffersen expressly held the collecting
banks to be the brokers' agents: "A bank in Cache
County was designated as an agent to receive delivered
orders from [the brokers] and to pay for such orders
in Cache County out of the accounts of USU" (Bosworth,
R. 150). A collecting bank's affiant likewise characterized his relationship with the brokers as one of agency.
Bear Stearns, R. 1548.
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The issue, of course, is not whether the University discussed the opinion with the brokers but whether the brokers
learned of the opinion, either through the collecting banks
or otherwise.
The University's principal theory of recovery
is that the brokers were charged with constructive knowledge
that all the stock purchases here were ultra vires.

A sec-

ondary theory of recovery, pleaded here and in the earlier
federal litigation, is that the brokers were put on actual
notice on or shortly after December 15, 1972, that the University might not have power to purchase stock and that
Catron may no longer have authority from the University to
continue to place purchase orders.

If this Court denies re-

covery as to all purchases on the primary theory, the University should be allowed to argue under its secondary theory
the facts by which it claims the brokers acquired actual
knowledge.

Although the University did not conduct any dis-

covery in these cases,1.i/ the Record already contains enough
evidence to raise triable issues of fact whether the brokers
knew that possibly the University had no power to purchase
any stock and/or that the University had revoked Catron's
authority.

}i/

Aft e r Se pt ember , 1 9 77 , the Tri a l Co urt 1 i mi t e d the
taking of depositions to a period of less than a
month and seemed to extend this right only to the
brokers (Bear Stearns, R. 1634-1636).
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CONCLUSION TO PARTS I AND II

Although the brokers have adduced a lengthy
list of purported defenses, the issues of this litigation
are few and relatively simple.

Those issues were squarely

before this Court in First Equity.

These brokers were also

before this Court in that case and argued at length--and
unsuccessfully--most of the defenses raised here,

Through-

out the protracted proceedings below, lasting four years,
Judge Christoffersen let himself be guided by the implacable
logic of the First Equity opinion.

However harsh the re-

sult, it was for the Legislature to change.1§./
The brokers' appeal is not to the settled law
of this and virtually every other state.

Their appeal is

to their self-interested view of equity.

They say, in effect,

that the State should be treated under these facts like any
private individua1.l.Z./

This view is simplistic.

does not treat all private individuals the same.

The law
Minors are

treated differently from adults in many contexts; women sometimes treated differently from men.

In each case of dissimilar

1§.I

First Equity, p. 892. Some states have enacted legislation to modify the common law in this regard. See
Wisconsin, Section 66.295 Stats. (1941). Utah has not
passed such a statute.

l.Z.I

Their quotation from Driggs v. Utah State Teachers Reti_.::i·
ment Board, 105 Utah 417, 425-426, 142 P.2d 657, 660-661
(1943) is misleading. The ruling there was not that the
state should make ultra vires pension payments but that
the teachers' rights to these payments had vested; and
under elementary principles of constitutional law those
rights could not be impaired by subsequent legislation.
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treatment, the law has concluded that policy considerations justify different treatment.

This rudimentary prin-

ciple of jurisprudence the brokers totally ignore.

They

have failed to show how circumstances have so changed in
Utah that it is no longer necessary to safeguard the public
treasury and protect the citizenry from unlimited expenditures by their unbridled public servants wishing to enter
the stock market.

It is not a matter of a"conservative"

versus a "socialistic" view of government.

It is a matter of

whether the people control their elected or appointed officials or whether those officials are allowed to commit
public money to investments not sanctioned by the Legislature.
The brokers' appeal to equity is thus inappropriate
at this stage of these lawsuits.

If this Court reverses, the

University receives nothing and the public is out over four
million dollars.

Any resort to equity should be deferred to

the damages phase of this litigation.

Gerzof v. Sweeney,

If it is inequitable for the University to recover

~·

all its losses, despite the First Equity holding,1.§./ this
Court would then be able to fashion a measure of damages to
take into consideration any equities which it finds to be
present.

1.§./

This was precisely what was done in Gerzof.

In

There the broker ~ought commissions and the decline in
the value of stock between the time it purchased it for
the University and the time the University refused payment. This Court denied recovery as to both elements of
claimed damage.
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stating this, the University does not concede there are
any equities in the brokers' favor.
The four brokers also appeal from the Trial
Court's order denying their counterclaims against the University (Bosworth did not file any counterclaims).

They

expressly ask this Court to reinstate the counterclaims to
allow them to recover their costs and attorneys' fees even
if they prevail on the issue of liability in the principal
actions.

They devote, however, no part of their brief to

their counterclaims (as opposed to their third-party complaints).

Their counterclaims are nothing more than a repe-

titian of their basic position that the University should
bear these losses.

They add nothing (except for their prayer

for costs and attorneys' fees) and should be treated like
their Rule 12(b)(6) motions.
As to their prayer for costs and attorneys' fees,
the brokers cite no relevant case authority.

Even if these

I
I

brokers prevail here, these suits can hardly be deemed frivolous in light of First Equity and supporting case law.
The Trial Court should be affirmed as to all
orders affixing the brokers with liability.
III
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE ORDERS HOLDING
THAT JURISDICTION IS HAD OVER THREE BROKERS
AND VENUE IN CACHE COUNTY WAS PROPER AS TO
TWO OTHERS.
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I
I

I
I
I

A.

JURISDICTION IS HAD OVER HORNBLOWER;
BEAR STEARNS; AND SUTRO UNDER BOTH
THE "MINIMAL CONTACTS" AND THE "DOING
BUSINESS" TESTS.

In Abbott G.M. Diesel v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d
850 (1978), this Court recognized two distinct concepts of
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants which it called the
"doing business" and "minimal contacts" tests. See especially
footnote 6.

That opinion was handed down after the parties

hereto briefed and the Trial Court ruled on the three brokers'
motions to dismiss for lack of .i.!!_personam jurisdiction.

At that

time, this Court had fai1ed to distinguish between the two tests.
Hill v. Zale Corp., 25 Ut.2d 357, 482 P.2d 332 (1971).

Now

that this Court has clarified the law, the University contends jurisdiction is had here over the brokers under each
test.
1.

Statement of Facts.

Hornblower
(1)

During the period when Catron purchased stock

from or through it, Hornblower advertised its operations as
"Nationwide UndenHiting and Distribution Services" with 65
offices "coast to coast" and "over 1100 registered representatives" (Bear Stearns, R. 222; hereafter, references to the
record are to the Bear Stearns record unless noted).

During

said period, Hornblower had been in business since 1888, and
was a member of all major stock exchanges.
tered in 39 states, including Utah.

It also was regis-

By early 1976, when it
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was served herein, it was registered in all states (R.
234).
(2)

It has been duly registered as a broker-

dealer with the Utah Securities Commission since May 14,
1965 (R. 213).
(3)

Between December, 1971, and September, 1972,

it executed for the University either as principal or agent
82 purchases of stock with a total net purchase price of
$2,238,974.80 for which it received commissions of $32,622.43

(Hornblower, R. 56-57).
(4)

Most if not all of the securities purchased

from Hornblower were paid for by the University delivering its
drafts to a Logan bank in exchange for the stock certificates

(R. 156-157).
(5)

Hornblower directed by mail to the University

at Logan a confirmation slip for each of the 82 purchases and
a monthly account statement during each month of the aforesaia
period.
(6)

All of the 82 purchases were made by the Uni-

versity following recommendations made by Louis Aragon, a
Hornblower employee, to Catron.

Aragon also recommended the

University purchase securities in other companies (R. 152).
(7)

Between June, 1972, and January, 1973, adver-

tisements for Hornblower appeared in periodicals widely cir·
culated and read in Utah.

Incomplete investigation reveals
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17 such advertisements appeared in said period in Business
Week, Finance Magazine, Forbes, and the Wall Street Journal,
five of them being full-page ads.

On November 12, 1975,

another ad appeared in the Wall Street Journal (R. 180-181).
(8)
Catron and other

Between December, 1971, and September, 1972,
~niversity

employees conversed by telephone

with Aragon and other Hornblower employees over 100 times,
either placing or receiving virtually all if not all of these
calls in Utah.

When Catron placed these calls, it was usually

collect, which Aragon always accepted (R. 152).
Bear Stearns ("Bear")
(1)

During the period when Catron purchased stock

from or through it, Bear was registered in 34 states and was
a member of all major

sto~k

exchanges (R. 228).

By the time

service was effected upon Bear in this action, in March, 1976,
it had registered in four more states, including Utah (R. 228).
(2)

Bear has been duly registered as a broker-

deal er with the Utah Securities Commission since September
26, 1974 (R. 214).
(3)

Between August, 1971,and February, 1973, it

executed for the University, either as principal or agent, at
least 47 orders to purchase stock with a total net purchase
price of $4,863,574.35 for which it received commissions of
$35,323.59 (R. 81-82).

Also, from December, 1971,to March,

1973, it executed for the University 25 sell orders for which
it received commissions of $34,760.33 (R. 236).
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(4)

Most if not all of the securities purchased

from Bear were paid for by the University delivering its
drafts to a Logan bank in exchange for the stock certificates
(R. 156-157).
(5)

Bear sent to the University by mail at Logan

a confirmation slip for each of the purchases and a monthly
account statement during each month of the aforesaid period.
(6)

Many if not most of the 47 purchases listed

in the complaint were made by the University following recommendations made by Jim Christensen, a Bear salesman, to Catron
(R. 152-153).

(R. 239).

Christensen admits making some recommendations

Once, Catron and Christensen together visited the

home office of one of the companies in which the University
invested and spoke with a top company executive, the meeting
having been arranged by Christensen (R. 153-154).
(7)

Between October, 1972,and January, ·1973, ad-

vertisements for Bear appeared in the Wall Street Journal.
Incomplete investigation shows seven such advertisements appeared in that four-month period alone.

Another ad appeared

December 19, 1975 (R. 180-181).
(8)

Between August, 1971, and March, 1973, Catron

and other University employees conversed by telephone with
Christensen and other Bear employees over 50 times, either
placing or receiving virtually all if not all of these calls
in Utah.

When Catron placed the call, it was usually collect.

which Christensen always accepted.

I
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l

(9)

Between November, 1971, and February, 1973,

Catron sent by mail from Logan at least 20 items of correspondence to Bear (R. 157).
Sutro
(1)

During the period when Catron placed orders

with it to purchase securities, Sutro was registered in 12
states, including six states east of the Mississippi River,
although its only offices

were in California (R. 226).

By the time service was effected upon it in this action,
in March, 1976, it had registered in 17 more states, for a
total of 29 states.

Among the states with which it registered

within the last three years are Arizona, Nevada, Colorado and
Wyoming (R. 232).
(2)

Between August, 1972,and January, 1973, it

executed for the University either as principal or agent at
least 12 orders to purchase stock having a total net purchase
price of $1,497,860.00 for which it received commissions of
$13,508.30 (R. 104).
(3)

Most if not all of the securities purchased

from Sutro were paid for by the University delivering its
drafts to a Logan bank in exchange for the stock certificates
(R. 156-157).
(4)

Catron established an account for the Uni-

versity with Sutro after having been invited by Sutro to attend a two or three day seminar for institutional investment
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managers

in Los Angeles, at which top level representatives

of many companies discussed the investment potential in their
respective companies.

Sutro not only brought together the

company spokesmen and otherwise sponsored the seminar, but
also paid for meals, refreshments and entertainment for all
attendees.

Catron attended two such Sutro seminars at Sutro's

invitation (R. 154).
(5)

Sutro sent to the University by mail at Logan

a confirmation slip for each of the purchases and a monthly
account statement during each month of the aforesaid period.
(6)

Between March, 1972,and February, 1973, and

between October, 1975, and February, 1976, advertisements for
Sutro appeared in periodicals widely circulated and read in
Utah.

Incomplete investigation shows ten such advertisements

appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Business Week and Finance
Magazine during the first period and eight such ads appeared
in the Wall Street Journal alone in the second period (R. 180181) .
(7)

In said period, Catron and other University

employees conversed by telephone with Diane Dyckman, Felix
Juda, and other Sutro employees numerous times, either placing
or receiving virtually all if not all of said calls in Utah.
When Catron placed the call, it was usually collect, which
Sutro always accepted (R. 154).
(8)

In February, 1973, Catron sent to Sutro from

Logan at least two items of correspondence relating to the
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purchase and sale of 320 debentures issued by Hanover
Square Realty Inventors for over $320,000.00 (R. 157).
2.

Jurisdiction Exists Under the "Minimal
Contacts" Test.

This Court in Abbott G.M. Diesel v. Piper Aircraft,~.

discussed what it termed the "minimal contacts"

concept of Utah's long-arm statute and reiterated that Utah's
jurisdictional standards should "not be more restrictive than
those allowed by federal due process limitations."
353.

.!.£.at

Borrowing heavily from a recent law review article,~/

this Court mentioned (at p. 354) three factors should be considered in applying the minimal contacts test:
(1) the nature and quality of defendants'
acts;
(2) whether the defendant engaged in purposeful rather than unintentional acts
to avail itself of the privileges and
protections of the forum state; and
(3) any other relevant matters bearing on
the notions of fair play and justice.
Applying these considerations against case law
and the facts of this litigation, it is clear that the test
is met.
a.

The nature and gualit,l'. of defendants' acts
subject them to Utah's jurisdiction.

It

is not necessary, as the brokers urge, that

th ere be some physical presence in the State.

l11

Conn v.

"In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah," 77 Utah Law Review
235 (1977).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-82-

Whitmore, 9 Ut.2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (Justice Crockett);
Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Industries, 265 F.2d 768,
773 (9th Cir. 1959) ("It is not necessary that defendants'
agent be physically within the forum, for this act or
transaction may be by mail only").

Since physical presence

is unnecessary, this litigation is squarely controlled by
Piantes v. Hayden Stone, 30 Ut.2d 110, 514 P.2d 529 (1973),
cert. den. 415 U.S. 995, reh. den. 416 U.S. 963.

There, a

California based stockbroker sold stock to Utah residents.
Of over 100 solicitations he made, all but 8 were made by
telephone from California as was done here., There, the
stockbroker did make eight solicitations while physically
present in Utah but that fact it has been seen could not
alone determine the holding there that jurisdiction was
had.
In Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S.
623, 627 (1935) an unregistered nonresident defendant was
held to have carried on a securities business.

The court

stated that, "Iowa treats the business of dealing in corporate securities as exceptional and subjects it to state
regulation."

In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1976),

the Supreme Court cited Doherty and Hess v. Polasky, 274 U.S.
352 (1927), the then-leading case on nonresident motorist
statutes, in support of statements that McGee v. Internatio~
Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1975) involved special legis·
I

I
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J

lation (The California Unauthorized Insurers Process
Act).

This Act, it said, was passed by California"

to exercise

. its 'manifest interest' in providing ef-

fective redress for citizens who had been injured by nonresidents engaged in an activity that the state treats as
exceptional and subject to special regulation," thus equating insurance, blue-sky and nonresident motorist statutes
as special situations.
Paulos v. Best Securities, Inc., 260 Minn. 283,
109 N.W.2d 576 (1961) involved an action under the Minnesota
Securities Act by a Minnesota resident against a foreign corporation having no contact with Minnesota except the sale to
the plaintiff of a security.
registered in the forum.
istered here.)

Like Sutro, the broker was not

~The other two brokers were reg-

The one sale, however, was held sufficient

to subject the corporation to the jurisdiction of the
Minnesota courts under the Minnesota long-arm statute.
In Koplin v. Thomas, Haab & Botts, 219 N.E.2d
646, 651 (Ill. 1966), the sale to Illinois residents by a
securities broker having no offices or other "presence" in
Illinois was held to subject the broker to Illinois jurisdiction.

The Koplin case is especially helpful precedent

because it construed the Illinois long-arm statute.

As ob-

served in Hughes Tool v. Meier, 486 F.2d 593, 595 (10th
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Cir. 1973), the Utah long-arm statute is "virtually
identical" to the language of the Uniform Interstate
and Foreign Civil Procedure Act, the long-arm provision
of which was patterned after the Illinois long-arm
statute.
b.

The brokers engaged in purposeful acts
to avail themselves of the privileges
and protections of Utah.

As stated by Justice Crockett in Hill v. Zale
~.

~·

jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is

warranted by the fact alone that the corporation is:
. . . permitted to enjoy the advantages
of having activities carried on within a state
to further its business interests under the
protection of its laws . . . . pp. 359-360.
Hornblower and Bear Stearns, by virtue of their registration
with the Utah Securities Commission, are permitted to act as
broker-dealers in Utah under the protection of its laws.
Furthermore, all three defendants are protected in the use
of their trade names (service marks) used in their advertising in Utah under Sec. 70-3-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953)
in that they may file for protection thereof.

Engineered

Sports Products v. Brunswick, 362 F.Supp. 722 (D.Utah 1973),
per Anderson, J.
c.

Other relevant matters bearing on the
notions of fair play and justice require
affirmance of the Trial Court.
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(1)

Registration of Hornblower and Bear
Stearns with the Utah Securities Commission and of Sutro with 30 jurisdictions and their engaging in interstate commerce negates any claim of
inconvenience or unfairness in defending in Utah.

In Mountain States Sports v. Sharman, 353 F.Supp.
613, 616 (D. Utah 1972), Judge Anderson construed the Utah
long-arm statute, noting that factors going to the ultimate
question of whether due process allowed the exercise of
jurisdiction included "the extent to which defendants engage in interstate commerce .
ience of defending in Utah."

and the general convenHe then found nothing in the

record there suggesting "hardship, injustice, or unusual inconvenience" would result, from defending in Utah, stating the
defendants there were engaged in interstate business dealings
"which suggest their general ability to litigate matters outside of California."

Likewise, all three brokers here are

engaged in interstate business dealings.

Their advertisements

in nationally circulated periodicals highlight the interstate
nature of their operations.

Bear Stearns and Hornblower now

are and were registered with the Utah Securities Commission
at the time these actions were filed (as well as with the
equivalent body

in~

other states in the case of Hornblower

and most other states in the case of Bear Stearns) and thereby consented to service upon them through the Director of the
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Utah Securities Commission in all matters arising under
the Utah Uniform Securities Act.

Sec. 61-1-26, Utah Code

Ann. (1953).
With respect to Sutro, though not registered
as a broker-dealer in Utah, it is registered in 30 separate
jurisdictions, including adjacent states of Arizona, Nevada,
Colorado and Wyoming.

It is thus hard to see how Sutro

(which has also advertised extensively in national publications widely read in Utah) would be inconvenienced by having
to defend in Utah.
(2)

The brokers knew they were dealing with
public monies.

All the cases relied on by the brokers involved
the more usual contract or tort litigation between private
parties.

Here, a public entity seeks to recover damages

resulting from state monies having been paid out unlawfully.
In accepting and filling the scores of orders for the purchase of securities involved here, the brokers must be presumed to have known that the University is a state institution supported by state monies.

Thus, it is hardly unfair

to have the brokers present their defenses in the state
whose citizens paid over $8,600,000.00.!Q_/ for the securities,

40/

Hornblower - $2,238,974.80
Bear
- $4,863,574.35
Sutro
- $1,497,574.00
Source: see footnote 41, infra.
-87-
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especially because they derived a total of well over
$105,000.00 in commissions.~/

It requires no citation

that the ultra vires doctrine was promulgated to protect
the public treasury to the ultimate benefit of the taxpayer.

These suits are between the brokers and the tax-

payers of Utah, as the Trial Court repeatedly noted.
That fact alone confers jurisdiction in accordance with
notions of fairness under the due process clause of the
United States Constitution, incorporated into the Utah
long-arm statute by sec. 78-27-22.
If the Court's ruling is that the University
can recover damages, it follows logically that jurisdiction
has been obtained.

In Hill v. Zale,

~·

Justice Crockett

stated:
When a foreign corporation is permitted
to enjoy the advantages of having activities
carried on within a state to further its business interests under the protection of its laws,
it is only fair and reasonable that its citizens
have some practical means of redress if grievances arise.
In quoting the above passage, the Trial Court recognized its
peculiar applicability to these cases.

~/

These brokers "entered

Hornblower - $32,622.43
Bear
- $35,323.59 + $34,760.33
Sutro
- $13,508.30
Source:

Bear Stearns, R. 236, 722-723; Hornblower,
R. 449-450; Sutro, R. 84. The amounts do not
include discounts or underwriting fees in those
cases where the broker acted as a principal.
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into the transactions assumingly for profits of their own
(Memorandum Decision, Merrill Lynch, R. 396)" under the
protection of Utah's laws.

Since these cases involve tax-

payer monies (Memorandum Decision, Bear Stearns, R. 21852186), it is only fair and reasonable that these taxpayers
have some practical means of redress.
(3)

The brokers advertised in Utah and
used the services of Utah banks to
receive the stock certificates and
to make payment for the stock.

As Judge Christoffersen stated in his Memorandum
Decision:
All three defendants, however, advertise their operations throughout the
United States and advertise in national
periodicals that they are in the business
of selling stocks, and that stocks may be
ordered from all three defendants from
outside the state of their place of business. In previous cases of University vs.
Merri 11 Lynch and Bosworth , Sul 1 i van Co . ,
who are in the State of Utah, arrangements
were made for USU delivering drafts to a
Logan bank. Stock certificates were placed
with these banks, paid for by USU drafts
from the banks. The actual placement of
the stock certificates with Logan banks
and their payment by USU drafts by the
banks were made in Logan, Utah. This would
certainly seem to be doing business in the
State of Utah and more particularly in Cache
County. The acts of placing the stock certificates with Logan banks, payments of
drafts at the Logan banks for such certificates, sending confirmation slips and account
statements to Utah, and delivering certificates
to Utah certainly appears to be sufficient acts
to confer jurisdiction over non-resident defendants (Bear Stearns, R. 293). (Emphasis
added.)
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(4)

The brokers solicited business from
the University.

Clearly the brokers all solicited (and obtained) substantial business from the University.

They

all conversed frequently with Catron, either calling him
or accepting his collect calls.

Sutro invited him to

and hosted him at two seminars for institutional customers
and prospective customers, paying for meals, refreshments,
and entertainment.

The fact that Sutro may not have actu-

ally recommended he purchase a particular security does not
mean that Sutro did not solicit the University's business.
As every salesman knows, solicitation takes many forms.
Hornblower and Bear Stearns actually recommended the University purchase certain securities, obviously hoping it
would use their broker

fa~ilities

to make those purchases.

That it purchased and sold securities through these three
brokers to the tune of over $105,000.00 in commissions attests to the success of their solicitation efforts.
3.

Jurisdiction is Had Under The "Doing
Business" Test

The "minimal contacts" test has been developed
to a pp 1y Utah's 1 ong-a rm statute (Utah Code Ann., Sections
78-27-22 to 28).

Preceding the passage of that Act in 1969,

Utah Courts developed a "doing business" test for purposes
of determining jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
alleged to be doing business in the State.

Secs. 78-27-20,
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21, Utah Code Ann. (1979); Rule 17(e), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Even under this older test, these brokers are

subject to this jurisdiction.
a.

That the brokers solicited business
from the University subjects them to
Utah jurisdiction.

In 1944, this Court, per Wade J., stated in
Industrial Commission v. Kemmerer Coal Co., 150 P.2d 373,
with reference to subjecting a nonresident corporation to
Utah jurisdiction:
. . . it would appear that very little
more than mere solicitation is necessary to
constitute "doing business" by a foreign corporation . . .
The liberalization of in personam jurisdiction in the last
35 years under the "doing business" test makes the Kemmerer
Coal case more compelling authority today.
efforts of these brokers has

jus~

The solicitation

been summarized.

That the

"very little more" than solicitation required in Kemmerer to
constitute "doing business" is present in these cases requires
no additional recitation.

As already discussed, two of the

brokers were registered in Utah.

All of them received sub-

stantial commissions which came from public monies.

And all

of them delivered stock certificates to Utah banks and mailed
confirmation slips and account statements directly to the
University.

These activities alone, coupled with the brokers'

solicitations, clearly satisfy the "solicitation-plus" rule of
the "doing business" test.
~.

"In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah.

pp. 235-239.
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l

b.

The services of the Logan banks were
frequently used by the brokers; indeed,
the banks were their aoents as a matter
of law.

The University maintains that as a matter of
law, the banks were agents of the brokers.

Judge Christoffersen

so held:
A bank in Cache County was designated
as an agent to receive delivered orders from
[the brokers] and to pay for such orders in
Cache County (Bosworth, R. 150).
See Phelan v. University National Bank, 229 M.E.2d 374 (Ill. 1967).
But even if the banks were not the brokers' agents in a technical legal sense, the brokers frequently and continuously
used the banks' services which, for purposes of establishing
jurisdiction, suffices.
Crockett in Hill v. Zale,

Remembering the language of Justice
~·

the brokers fully utilized

the services of two Uta~ banks to further their own business
interests and thus cannot complain it would be unfair to compel them to defend in Utah.
c.

The brokers' activities in the State
were substantial and continuous.

A significant factor in applying the "doing business" test is whether the activities of a nonresident carporation were substantial and continuous.

Here, the brokers'

activities ranged from a period of six months (Sutro) to eighteen months (Bear Stearns).

Over eighteen months, Bear Stearns

conducted over 72 trades for the University (Bear Stearns, R.
236, 722-723).

Over a nine-month period, Hornblower filled
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82 University purchase orders (Hornblower, R. 449-450).
During these extended periods of trading for the University,
the brokers' salesmen conversed frequently and continuously
with Catron, accepting dozens of long distance calls in the
process.ill

Throughout this time, the brokers sent a con-

firmation slip after each trade and also sent monthly account
statements directly to the University in Utah.
solicitation for business within Utah was
systematic, and of long duration. 11441
4.

The brokers'

thus "continuous,

The Brokers' Cases Are Distinguishable.

In Producers Livestock Loan Co. v. Miller, 580
P.2d 603 (Utah 1978), this Court gave examples of "necessary
and practical limitations" upon the expanded concept of longarm jurisdiction.

One example was where a person buys stock

in a corporation located in and carried on in another state.
These cases, however, involve a person buying stock in dozens
of corporations through the same broker, then suing the broker;
they do not involve suits against the corporation issuing the
stock as in this Court's example.
The brokers' reliance on Foreign Study League v.
Holland-America Line, 27 Utah 2d 442, 497 P.2d 244 (1972) is

~/

Catron conversed long distance with Bear Stearns over
50 times, with Hornblowers' salesmen over 100 times,
and also with Sutro's employees numerous times (Bear
Stearns, R. 152-153).

~/

"In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah,"~· p. 237.
-93-
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also misplaced.

That case did not turn on the fact that

the defendant's representatives traveled to Utah on several
occasions.

Conn v.

Whitmore,~-

Finally, Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp.,
548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976) is neither controlling nor reliable
authority.
as here.

In Union Ski, there was no continuity of activity
The defendant there had not advertised or solicited

business from the Utah plaintiff as here.

There, the con-

tract was made in California whereas here the orders were
placed by telephone from Utah.

Payments there were made in

California; here, payments were made to Utah banks from which
the University picked up the certificates.

Finally, Union

Ski did not involve two defendants registered with a Utah
regulatory agency nor .a factual setting
were at stake.

Utah tax monies

Parenthetically, Union Ski has been shown to

be unreliable in several key respects.
diction in

1~here

Utah,"~·

"In Personam Juris-

pp. 245-251.

B.

VENUE WAS PROPER IN CACHE COUNTY ON THE
GROUND THAT THE WRONG OCCURRED THERE.

1.

Statement of Facts

The allegations of the complaints, supplemented
by the affidavits, establish as uncontroverted the following:
(1)

In a number of cases, some involving both brokers,

Catron mailed from Logan checks drawn.on the University's accounts
with Logan banks to pay for purchases.
i

(2)

The University's monies, which Catron used to
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buy securities and pay commissions, were located in Logan.
(3)

In the case of both brokers, Catron often

requested in placing orders to purchase that payment be made
against the securities at one of two Logan banks, and the
brokers complied.

Consequently, these securities were de-

livered by the brokers herein, or their agents, to the Logan
banks which in turn delivered them to the University in exchange for payment.

In the case of many

payment-against-

delivery orders placed with Bosworth, the Logan bank used in
the "collection" process transmitted the funds it received
from the University to the First National Bank of Denver, not
to a Bosworth account in Salt Lake City (Bosworth, R. 126).
(4)

In the case of six orders to purchase placed

by Catron with Merrill Lynch, the latter acted as principal
(dealer), selling the securities to the University for its
own account (Bosworth, R. 314).
2.

The Trial Court's Order

Bosworth and Merrill Lynch argue that venue was
improper in Cache County and appeal from the Trial Court's
order to the contrary.

The Trial Court stated, after noting

the brokers' contention that any wrong would have been in
that the University placed purchase orders with their Salt
Lake City offices:
Such an order may have been placed to
people in the Salt Lake office but the performance of the same occurred in Cache County.
A bank in Cache County was designated as an
agent to receive delivered orders from both
defendants and to pay for such orders in Cache
County out of the accounts of the University.
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Such payments, in Cache County out of the
University funds, would comprise the alleged wrongful acts. Whether or not these
were authorized by Catron, the University's
agent, does not go the question of venue
since both defendants had agreed to this
procedure and followed the same. Since
both defendants agreed to and designated
Cache County as the place of delivery and
the lace of a ment, the Court holds venue
Bosworth, R.
ro erl lies in Cache Count
150-151; emphasis added .
It is simply not true, as Bosworth contends,
that the above holding rested on the ground that Cache County
was the residence of the University.
3.

Venue in Cache Count Is Pro er Under
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-13-7 1953

a.

The wrong occurred in Cache County.

The University relies upon that part of sec.
78-13-7 allowing actions nqt covered by other specific venue
provisions to be tried in the county in which the cause of
action arises.

The brokers agree that the cause of action

arises "where the wrong occurs."
The brokers argue, variously, that the wrong
consisted of:
(1)

Merrill Lynch assenting to the transactions

from its Salt Lake City office (four brokers' brief, p. 76); or
(2)

Bosworth opening an account for the Univer-

sity, accepting, transmitting and confirming all University purchase orders "at or from" Bosworth's Salt Lake City office; and
receiving all new account documents and University authorizaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tions at its Salt Lake City office (Bosworth brief, p. 44). 44/
The brokers' above analysis ignores the gravamen of these
complaints, which is that the University paid out monies
illegally for which it now brings suit.

The ultra vires doc-

trine, which these cases invoke, was designed to prevent the
wrongful expenditure of public money; it was only designed to
prevent third parties from executing contracts with public
bodies to the extent those contracts called for unlawful expenditures.

Thus, the wrong was not the accepting of purchase

orders which may or may not have occurred in Sa 1 t Lake City but
rather the accepting of the University's money--which occurred
in Logan in the case of all payment-against-delivery orders.
In the case of payment-against-delivery orders placed with
Bosworth, the money never went to Salt Lake County but went
directly from the Logan collecting bank to Denver.
b.

The collecting banks were the brokers'
agents for purposes of venue.

It is not necessary that the two Logan banks were
the brokers' agents, strictly speaking, for this Court to
affirm venue. Judge Christoffersen held them to be the
brokers' agents, however, and if he was right no further
inquiry is necessary.

The fact that Catron initially

chose the banks does not preclude them from being the
44/

The key sentence of Bosworth ' s b r i e f : "A 1 1 orders for
the purchase and sale of securities were entered by the
University at Bosworth's Salt Lake County office and
were accepted, transmitted and confirmed by the defendant at or from its Salt Lake City office.", is not
supported by any affidavit.
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brokers' agents.

Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section

15, 3 Am.Jur. 2d Agency, Sections 17-18.

Nor does the fact

that the banks may have been acting simultaneously as agents
for both the University and the brokers.
Section 234.

3 Am.Jur.2d Agency,

Under Utah commercial law, a collecting bank

is an agent for the owner of securities.

Utah Code Ann.(1953)

Sections 70A-4-201(1), 105(d) and 104(l)(g).

Under the Illi-

nois version of the Uniform Commercial Code, identical to
Utah's in all material respects, the Illinois Supreme Court
held a bank performing the same functions as the two Logan
banks to be a collecting bank.
Bank,

~-

Phelan v. University National

The brokers attack this holding on the ground

the two banks were "payor" banks, not "collecting" banks.
Their argument assumes, moreover, that the items the brokers
sent the Logan banks were "sight drafts."

The banks themselves

convincingly demonstrated they were not payor banks and the
i t ems not " s i g h t d r a ft s "
1567).

( ae a r S tear ns , R. 15 48 - 15 4 9 , 15 6 6-

Finally, it should be noted that if the University,

after paying the Logan bank for an order of stock placed
through the brokers and receiving the certificates, had then
tried to stop the bank from transmitting the money on to the
brokers, it most assuredly would have failed.

Certainly, the

banks' refusal to honor the University's instructions under
these hypothetical facts would beinconsistentwith the banks
being the University's agent and not the brokers' agent.
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c.

The injury occurred throughout the
State and particularly in Cache County.

If these actions succeed, it is because the law
recognizes a wrong done to taxpayers throughout the State.
Indeed, this was the foundation of Judge Christoffersen's
decision.

Logically, these actions could be brought in any

county in the State.

Certainly they are properly laid in

Cache County, the location of the University whose monies
have been dissipated.
CONCLUSIGN TO PART III
The Trial Court held that the Logan banks were
collecting banks acting as the brokers' agents in receiving
their stock certificates, holding them until the University
paid for them, and transmitting the funds so collected on to
the brokers.

This holding is sound and supported by case law.

Since each broker used the collecting banks as agents in at
least some of its transactions, that agency alone establishes
jurisdiction over the three nonresident brokers and alone is
a basis for proper venue of the suits against Bosworth and
Merrill Lynch.
However, even if the banks were not agents for
purposes of jurisdiction and venue, although clearly agents
for purposes of commercial law, this Court should still affirm
the orders below.

Independent of the Trial Court's holding

that the banks were the brokers' agents, there are sufficient
grounds under both the Utah long-arm statute and the older
concept of doing business to support jurisdiction over the
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nonresident brokers; and likewise there is sufficient support for venue to be laid in Cache County where the ultra
vi res payments 1-1ere made and accepted.
CONCLUSION
The central issue here is rather simple (although
the brokers' ingenuity in devising defenses contained in two
appellant's briefs necessitates a lengthy response).

Should

this Court follow the logic of First Equity to its inexorable
conclusion; or should it in the name of equity carve out a
broad exception to the principle that sound public finance
requires private persons to ascertain the limits of a public
body's powers.

The brokers here did nothing more to ascertain

the University's powers than in the case of a private customer-and were further shoddy in executing trades for the University
long before receiving written authority if, indeed, two of the
brokers ever received such authority.

To deny at least some

measure of recovery would be to broadcast to vendors eve~ywhere
that the State's limitations on contractual powers can be circumvented if the public monies are unlawfully disbursed fast
enough.

It would also leave the taxpayer remediless although

he had no control over the University's actions here and cannot
be blamed for the ultra vires payments.
These orders should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted September 28, 1979.
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Utah Attorney General
By

CJ)~

iv. 1(~

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Special Assistant Attorney General
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INDEX TO DEPONENTS
Title

Deponent
Bingham, Jay R.

Member, Institutional Council of usu

Bowcutt, Jay

Staff Assistant to Donald A. Catron

Broadbent, Dee A.

Vice President for Business, USU

Bullen, Phillip A.

Member, Institutional Council of USU

Burr, Loren

Partner, Salt Lake City Office of
Ernst & Ernst

Catron, Donald A.

Controller and Assistant Vice President, USU

Hammond, O.C.

Member, Institutional Council of USU

I

Harris, Jay Dee

Member, Institutional Council of USU

Janes, Lynn

Controller, USU

I
I

Kumpfer, Beverly D.

Member, Institutional Council of USU

Madsen, Mark A.

Assistant Attorney General

Neuberger, L. Mark

Secretary to the Institutional Council.

Olsen, Snell

Member, Institutional Council of USU

Peterson, Robert C.

Auditor, State Auditor's Office

Plowman, Rex G.

Member, Institutional Council of USU

Robins, W. B.

Member, Institutional Council of USU

Sherratt, Gerald R.

Assistant to the President, USU

Snow, Alva C.

Member, Institutional Council of USU

usu

Stockdale, William R. Member, Institutional Council of USU
Taggart, Glen L.

President, USU

Tibbals, Jane S.

Member, Institutional Council of USU

Watkins, William E.

Internal Auditor, USU
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FIRST EQUITY CORPORATION OF FLORIDA, a Florida Corporation, Plain·
tiff and Appellant,

v.
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, a body polltic and corporate, and Donald A. Catron,
an Individual. Defendants and Respond-

ents,
Bear Stea.rns & Co., Bosworth-Sullivan &

Company, Inc., et al., Amici Curiae.
No. 13798.

Supreme Court ot Utah.
Dec. 23, 1975.

Stockbroker brought action to recover
commissions and other moneys lost as result of the refusal of state university to accept and 'pay for common stock ordered by
university employee for the university. The
First District Court, Cache County, VeN oy
Christoffersen, J., gTanted summary judgment for the university, and stockbroker
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hyde, District Judge, held that the university did not
have the power to purchase common stock
with public funds in its possession; thus,
the agreement to purchase stock and pay
commissions was ultra vires and unenforceable.
Affirmed.
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I. Colleges and Universities G=>I, 6(4)

Utah State University which is a state
institution holds property in trust for state
and is subject to laws of state enacted relating to its purposes and government and,
in this vein, is similar to a municipal corporation which also derives its powers from
the state and deals with public funds.
2. Colleges and Universities ct=>6(3)

Grant to Utah State University of the
power to handle its own financial affairs
did not give university authority to invest
in common stock with public funds. Const.
art. 10, § 4; U.C.A.1953, 53-32-2, 5.>-48-10
(5), 53-48-20(3).
3. Colleges and Universities ¢=6(3)

Statute allowing public corporations,
such as Utah State University, to invest
funds in their possession in bonds and other
obligations of the United States did not
give Utah State University the power to
purchase common stock with funds in its
possession. U.C.A.1953, 33-1-1, 33-1-3.
4. Appeal and Error ct:>l71(1)

Ordinarily, an appellant cannot raise
a theory on appeal for first time di ffercnt
from that presented to trial court.
5. Public Contracts

e= 14

Rules denyint recovery on an ultra
vircs contract entered by public entity arc
based on theory that party actually dealing
with public entity is charged with knowledge that contract is ultra vi res and unenforceable.
6. Brokel'1 €=16

Stockbroker whose customer was state
university was chargeable with knowledge
that university's contract to buy common
stock with public funds was ultra vires and
thus could not shift to seller the loss incurred when university refused to accept
and pay for stock.
7. Colleges and Universities ct:>5, 6(3)

Agreement by Utah State University
to purchase common stock with public
funds in its possession and to pay commissions to broker was ultra vires and
unenforceable. Const. art. 10, § 4; U.C.

A.1953, 33-1-1, 33-1-3, 53-32-2, 53-4&-IO
(5), 53-48-20(3).

Norman S. Johnson, Randall P. Spackman and Christine :-.1:. Durham of Johnson & Spackman, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., David
L Wilkinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for Utah State U.
Darwin C. Hansen, Bountiful, for Catron.
Keith E. Taylor of Parsons, Behlc &
Latimer, Salt Lake City, for Bear Stearns
& Co., amici curiae.
Harold G. Christensen of Worsley Snow
& Christensen, Salt Lake City, for Sullivan
& Co., amici curiae.
HYDE, District Judge:
This is an action brought by a stock
broker, First Equity Corporation of Florida,
against Utah State University (USU) and
Donald A. Catron, formerly the Assistant
Vice-President of Finance of Utah State
Unive~sity, for the recovery of commissions
and other monies lost by First Equity as a
result of USU's refusal to accept and pay
for certain shares of common stock which
had been ordered by Catron for USU.
First Equity filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment and USU filed a Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment based on its affirmative defense that the orders for the purchase of stock which Catron placed on behalf of USU were ultra vires in that USU
had no power to purchase stock and, there·
fore, USU had no obligation to pay for the
stock or any commissions.
First Equity appeals from the Trial
Court's denial of their Motion and the
granting of Summary Judgment to USU.
The defendant Catron is not involved in
the Motions or this appeal.
USU authorized Catron to purchase securities of any kind through any broker
who was a member of any major securities
exchange or the National Association of
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Securities Dealers. Pursuant to this authority, Catron opened a special cash account with First Equity and through that
account Catron ordered and USU received
and accepted and paid for certain securities.
After receiving an opinion from the Attorney General's office that USU should not
be investing in stocks, USU refused to accept delivery and pay for the stocks giving
rise to this action.
USU revoked Catron's authority prior
to the purchase of the stocks in question but
apparently neither the resolution granting
Catron authority nor the resolution revoking his authority was transmitted to First
Equity.
The case of The Unic·ersity of Utah v.
The Board of Eraminers of the State of
Utah, 4 Utah 2d 4-08, 295 P.2d 348, which
determined the status of the University of
Utah would be applicable to Utah State
University. USU is a corporation and thus
constitutes a legal entity with lir1'ited capacity. It was created and exists for the
sole purpose of more conveniently governing and conducting the educational institution. It is a state institution, a public corporation 1 not above the power of the Legislature to control and is subject to the laws
of this state from time to time enacted relating to its purposes and government.
Utah State Legislature has from time to
time exercised control over USU and given
USU some power of investment. The direct question presented here is whether or
not USU is empowered to invest in common
stock with public funds.
It is the position of First Equity and the
Amici Brokers that USU had the power to
invest in common stock as part of its general power to control and supervise all appropriated and donated funds.

Utah

889

ing Board of Trustees was established with
the following duties and powers:
They shall have the general control
and supervision of the agricultural college, the farm pertaining thereto, and
such lands as may be vested in the college by Territorial legislation, of aU appropriations made by the Territory for
the support of the same, and also of lands
that may hereafter be donated by the Territory
or by any person or corporation, in trust for the promotion of
agricultural and industrial pursuits.
(emphasis added)
It is this "general control
of
all appropriations" that appellant claims
was perpetrated in 1895 by Article X, Section 4, of Utah Constitution, which provides:
The location and establishment by existing laws of the University of Utah,
and the Agricultural College are hereby
confirmed, and all rights, immunities,
franchises, and endowments heretofore
granted or conferred, are hereby perpetuated unto said University and Agricultural College respectively.
In 1929 the Legislature changed the name
of the Agricultural College to Utah State
Agricultural College and constituted it a
"body politic and corporate." In 1957 the
Legislature again changed the name, this
time to Utah State University of Agricultural and Applied Sciences. The Legislature expressly perpetuated "all rights, immunities, franchises, and endowments heretofore granted or conferred" upon the college. The statute further provided that
USU:

USU was created in 1888 (Compiled
laws of Utah, Section 1855) and a govern-

. may have and use a corporate
seal, may sue and be sued and contract
and be contracted with. It may take,
hold, lease, sell and convey real and

I. "A public corporation which is not munici·
pal ia one created by the State solely as it.9
own device and agency .
A. Stat~
Univenitv .
. . and a State Board of
Education constitute. if incorporated, illu.ttrcr
tion4 of thi.t cla.t.t. Because the independent
P<>wer of such corporations is frequently

nominal, or small .
. and their officers
and members (if any) have no individual in·
terest in them. these organizations are some-.
times described . . . as public quasi corporations." 1 McQuillin, Municipal CorporatiO.... (1971 Rev. VG!. Section• 2.03(b) p.
133).

S4'4 P.26-56V:t
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personal property as the interests of the
college may require. (UCA 53--32-2)
The Higher Education Act of 1969
(UCA 53---IS-10( 5)) states each university
or college
may do its own purchasing, issue its own payroll, and handle
its own financial affairs under the general
supervision of the Board as provided by this
Act.
And in addition thereto, the 1969 Act
specifics (UCA 53-48-20(3)):
Any institution, college or department or
its foundation or organization engaged in
a program authorized by the board may:
(c) Accept contributions, grant or gifts
from any private organization .
( d) Retain, accumulate, invest, commit
and expend the funds and proceeds of
such authorized programs
Nothing in the Constitution or legislative
action involving USU specifically grants
or denies to USU the power to invest state
appropriations in common stock. Appellant
and Amici contend that the general control
and supervision of all appropriations and
the granted power to do its own purchasing,
is sue its own payroll and handle its own financial affairs are broad, general grants of
power and would include the power to invest in common stock in the absence of specific legislative provisions to the contrary.
Whether or not the grant of a "general
control" of "all appropriations" and the
right to "handle its own financial affairs"
grant unrestricted power to invest is answered by The University r>f Utah v. Board
of Examiners of the State of Utah (supra)
case. After quoting Sections I and 2 of
Article X of the Constitution which mandates the Legislature to provide for the
maintenance of the University of Utah and
USU, the Court states:
Would it be contended by the University
that under Article X, Section I, it might
compel the Legislature to appropriate
money the University considers essential?
ls it contended that the demands of the
University are not subject to constitutional debt limits? If so, respondent would

have the power to destroy the solvency of
the State and all other institutions by de·
mands beyond the power of the State to
meet.

The Court then quotes in full Sections
and 7 of Article X of the Constitution,
which provides, respectively, that the proceeds of the sale of land reserved by Congress for the University of Utah shall constitute permanent funds of the State, and
that all public school funds shall be guaranteed by the State against loss or diversion.
Then the Court concludes:
It is inconceivable that the framers of the
Constitution in light of the provisions of
Sections I, S and i of Article X and the
provision as to debt limitations intended
to place the University above the only
controls available for the people of this
State as to the property, management and
government of the University. We arc
unable to reconcile respondent's position
that the University has a blank check as
to all its funds with no. pre-audit and no
restraint under the provisions of the Constitu'tion requiring the State to safely invest and hold the dedicated funds and
making the Stale guarantor of the public
school funds against loss or diversion.
To hold that respondent has free and uncontrolled custody and use of its property
and funds while making the State guarantee said funds against loss or diversion
is inconceivable. We believe the framers
of the Constitution intended no such result. (emphasis added)

[ l J As stated above, it is clear since The
University of Utah v. Board of Examiners
of the State of Utah (supra) case that USU
is clearly a state institution and that it holds
property in trust for the State of Utah and
is subject to the laws of the State enacted
relating to its purposes and government. In
this vein it would be similar to a municipal
corporation which also derives its powers
from the State and deals with public funds.
The approach of common law in interpreting legislative grants of power to public
bodies concerning the handling of public
monies is illustrated by National S11rety v.
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State, Ill Oki. 180, 239 P. 257 (1925), a
case involving the question of whether a

in Vaa Eaton o·. Town oj Sydney, 211
Iowa 986, 231 N.W . .+i5, 47i, 71 A.LR.

county treasurer under a statute empower-

820, citing numerous cases:

ing him to sell bonds initially purchased
with county sinking funds, had power to reinvest the proceeds of sale in similar bonds.
In holding that he did not, the Court stated:
It seems certain that, in the absence
of statutory authority to invest the sinking funds in his hands, it was the duty
of the county treasurer to preserve the
sinking funds which came into his official hands intact in money. Before the
custodian of the sinking fund could invest such funds in any manner, he must
be able to put his finger upon some express statutory provision which would
authorize the investment.
This Court has held that municipal pow:
ers cannot lightly be inferred by implication.
In Moss v. Board of Commissioners, l Utah
2d 60, 261 P.2d 961 (1953) it was said:
This Court has not favored the extension of the power of the city by implication, and the only modification of such
doctrine is where the power is one which
is necessarily implied. Unless this requirement is met, the power cannot be
deduced from any consideration of convenience or necessity, or d~$irability of
such result, and no doubtf~l inference
from other powers granted or from ambiguous or uncertain provisions of the
law would be sufficient to sustain such
authority.

"\I/here a statute coniers certain specific powers, those not enumerated are
withheld. [n other words, enumeralion of powers operates to exclude
such as are not enumerated." (emphasis added)

[Z] A general grant to handle its financial affairs does not give authority to invest
in common stock. The power to invest is
not granted in the absence of legislation
to the contrary but the reverse is true. It
depends upon a specific authorizing grant
of such power.
The only specific Utah statute on the subject of investment of USU would be Section
33-1-1. 2 Section 33-1-1 is a one sentence
paragraph containing over .+SO words, but
the basic structure is: Investments by
(named parties) of their own funds or
f~·ds in their possession (in specified securities) shall be lawful. The "named parties" include "any private, political or public
corporation or person" and
its provisions and meaning would apply to
USU as a public corporation as well as private persons and private corporations. The
"specified securities" enumerated are all
government guaranteed securities such as
"bonds and other obligations of
the United States." The stocks in question
in this lawsuit do not fall within enumerated securities set forth in that section.

A tendency to narrowly interpret grants
of legislative power to municipalities is also
seen in Tott.,. of Worland v. O'Dell and
Johnson, 79 Wyo. l, 329 P.2d 797 (1958):

Section 33-1-3 which was enacted as part
of the same act in 19~9 as Section 33-1-1
provides in relevant part :

all the courts, without a single
exception so far as we know, agree that
a municipality has only such powers as
arc granted to it by the legislature. That
itself seems to mean that a power not
granted is a power prohibited. As stated

The provisions of this act are supplemental to any and all other laws relating to and declaring what shall be legal
investments for the persons, corporations,
organizations and officials referred to in
this act
. • (emphasis added)

The State Legislature has taken an interest
in investments by state agencies and regulated
"industries".

Insurallce Companie•, l:CA 31-13-1 et seq.
Department of Finan~. L'Ca 63-2--34
State Land Board, UCA 6:>-1--65 (pr..,ent
statute)

2.

l:tah State Retirement Board, UCA 49-9-12
Fiduciaries, UCA 7-5-11
Utah Rep. 54J-55J ? 2d-5
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by contracts made without authority or
in excess of the power of such corporations is conceded. The rule applicahle is
stated in 15 C.]. 540 as follows:

Section 33--1-1 is simply a declara-

tion that investments in specified securities

are lawful. Without prohibiting any other
investments or reqt•iring only the listed investments, the Legislature declared that certain investments were lawful. It is apparent that in enacting Section 33--1-3 the
Legislature envisioned situations where the
"named parties" mentioned in Section 33-1-1 might be empowered to invest in securities of a type not enumerated in Section
33-1-1.l Further, the language of Section
33--1-3 quoted above was worded to include
within its meaning any laws which the
Legislature might enact thereafter. Subsequent to the enactment of Section 33-1-3,
the Legislature has enacted statutory definitions of what arc legal investments for
some state agencies and regulated "industries".' However, no other statute enacted
prior or subsequent to L939 defines specifically what type of securities USU may
legally invest in. It must be concluded,
therefore, that USU had no specific designated power from the Constitution or the
Legislature to invest its funds in securities
outside those declared lawful by 33-1-1
and investments in common stock arc ultra
vires acts.
\¥hat, then, is the effect of an ultra vires
contract by a public corporation?
In News Advocate Publishing Co. v. Carbon County, 72 Utah 88, 269 P. 12'> (1928),
the Carbon County Oerk caused to be published in plaintiff newspaper a Notice of
Sale of Property on which taxes were delinquent. Defendant County, on receiving the publication bill, refused payment on
the basis that the contract was ultra vires
because the County Commissioners had no
statutory power to authorize such a publication as the one therein involved. Therein this Court said:
The general principle or rule of law
that municipal corporations are not bound
3. In 1939 when Sections 33-1-1 and 33-1-3
were enacted, the State Land Board already
possessed statutory power to invest its funds
in securities not enumerated in Section 33-11, e. g., "state, county, city or school district
bonds".

"A County is not bound by a contract beyond the scope of its power or
foreign to its purposes, or which is outside of the authority of the officers
making it. In this connection it is the
rule that the authority of a county
board to make contracts is strictly limited to that conferred, either expressly
or impliedly, by statute, regardless of
benefit to the county or of value received; and the same is true as to
other county officers attempting to
contract on behalf of the county.
*
* All persons dealing with
officers or agents of counties are
bound to ascertain the limits of their
authority or power as fixed by statutory or organic law, and are chargeable with knowledge of such limits.
No estoppel can be created by the acts
of such agents or officers in excess
of lheir statutory or constitutional
powers."
J:or further authority for the proposition
that "one who deals with a municipal corporation does so at his peril" see Tlia.tcher
Chemical Co. v. Sall Lake City Corporation,
21 Utah 2d 355, 455 P.2d i69 ( 1968) and
cases cited therein.
If the enforcement of this rule at tim.s
appears harsh, it is a matter for the State
Legislature to correct.
(~)
Although this action was commenced and argued at the lower Court on
the basis of breach of contract between the
parties, plaintiff and Amici now contend
that in any event plaintiff should be entitled to recover because they were acting
as the agents of USU.5 Under the theory
of agency, one of two things would occur;

4. See Footnote 2 above.
5.

Orc.lioarily, an appellant rannot raise a
theory on appeal for the fin1t time different
from that presented to the Court below.
Davi• v. lfulholland, 25 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d
834 (1970).
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either the loss would have to be absorbed
by the seller of the stocks who doesn't have
the faintest idea that his stock is being purchased by a public corporation or the rules
denying recovery on ultra vires contracts
of a public corporation would be meaningless. Substantive rights involving public
funds should not be determined by the custom of the securities industry in designating the broker as the agent of the buyer or
as agent of the buyer and seller. The rules
denying recovery of an ultra vires contract
are based on the theory that the party actually dealing with the public entity is charged
with the knowledge that the contract is
ultra vires and unenforceable, and in this
case the plaintiff is the party actually deal-
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ing with the public entity and this action
was filed on that basis-that USU was a
customer of First Equity.
[7] USU had no power to enter into an
agreement for the purchase of common
stock and the agreement to purchase and
pay commissions thereon. are ultra vires
agreements and unenforceable.
The Trial Court's granting of Summary
Judgment to USU is affirmed.
No costs awarded.
HENRIOD, C. J., and ELLETT,
CROCKETT, and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.
MAUGHAN,
herein.

J.,

does not participate
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